

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE

SIMON KUZNETS KHARKIV NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

**Texts and tasks
on the academic discipline
"THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF UKRAINE"
for students of all training directions,
all forms of study**

**Kharkiv
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Compiled by A. Pastushenko

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The key texts on the academic discipline are given according to the modules and themes of the syllabus. Every text is followed by questions intended to stimulate students' analytical reflection. The work aims to improve students' knowledge of the syllabus themes through elaboration of the auxiliary information taken from texts written or translated by native speakers, stimulate students' analytical and critical thinking, and enhance students' autonomous learning.

Recommended for students of all training directions, all forms of study.

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Introduction

In Ukraine, like anywhere in the world, it is very important to develop the student's autonomy in studying. If successfully realized, this autonomy will bring students to a new level, both in better employability and effective self-development. This work aims to enhance and support students' autonomous studying in the field of social and economic history of Ukraine.

The work covers a long timeline, from appearance of the first hominids in Ukraine to the present-day Ukraine with its much more complicated economic relations and differentiated society. Thus, the historical period considered is circa 1 m years BC up to the early twenty-first century AD.

The excerpts collected are taken both from primary and secondary sources.

The goals are to improve students' knowledge of the syllabus themes through work with the auxiliary information taken from texts written or translated by native speakers; to stimulate students' analytical and critical thinking, to make students' autonomous studying more effective.

When working with the collection of texts students should read carefully each excerpt and answer from memory the following questions. It would be also good advantage for students to make their own questions on the excerpt, just read and answer them from memory, then check answers looking through the text.

Working with the collection of texts will improve the autonomous learning, widen the students' outlook, and enhance the development of the following competences: the ability to make criticism and self-criticism; to find, set, and solve problems; to search and research information from different sources; to act with respect for the ethic values.

Content module 1

The socioeconomic development of the Ukrainian lands from the ancient times to the late nineteenth century

Theme 1. The development of economy and society in the Ukrainian lands in the pre-Kyivan times

The Earliest Inhabitants

The earliest **traces** of human habitation in Ukraine reach back to about 150,000 years. By approximately 40,000 BC, in the midst of the last ice age, the Cro-Magnons (or Homo sapiens) appeared, the species from whom modern man has **descended** – relatively tall, erect, and with greatly enlarged brain **capacity**. In response to the cold, unforgiving climate and the difficulties in **obtaining** food, these hunters and gatherers produced an unprecedented **array** of technological innovations: **flint** weapons and tools, fish-hooks, harpoons, and **shelters** made of animal **hides** and bones.

During the Neolithic period, which lasted in Ukraine from about 6 000 to 2 000 BC, mankind experienced more **profound** changes than in the previous two to three million years. It is in the radically new ways that humans developed for feeding themselves that the "revolutionary" significance of this age lies. Instead of **merely** gathering and hunting food, human beings had finally learned to produce it.

In Ukraine, agriculture is thought to have first made its appearance in the south-west, between the Buh and Dnister rivers where the earliest agricultural communities in Eastern Europe evolved about 5 000 to 4 000 BC. Instead of wandering about in search of **game**, people settled down in order to be near their fields. Villages came into existence. Because agriculture, unlike hunting and gathering, demanded a relatively large **labor force**, the population **increased rapidly**. As it did, primitive forms of political and social organization slowly developed.

Questions:

1. When did the first humans appear in Ukraine?
2. What was the essence of the "revolutionary" events?
3. What were the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the agriculture?

The Trypillian Culture (the 4th – 3rd millennia BC)

Generally, the settlements of the early period covered an area of 0.5 – 6 ha and contained no more than 15 dwellings. Later, Trypillians also built larger settlements, which were 20 – 40 ha in size and contained around 200 dwellings...

The 1970s saw the **sensational discovery**, through **aerial photographs** and through excavations of some **extremely** large sites in the Southern Buh region: Talianky (450 ha), Maidanetske (270 ha), Dobrovody (250 ha), and Nebelivka (220 ha). These enormous settlements contained between 1 300 and 2 700 buildings, 75 % of which were dwellings and the remainder of which were structures for domestic activities...

Trypillian agriculture may be characterized as extensive slash-and-burn, with rather frequent changing of the cultivated fields...

Stock-breeding was the second important part of the Trypillian subsistence economy. The herds were composed primarily of cattle... About 30 % of the animals in the early period were pigs...

Hunting was an essential source of meat in the Trypillian diet, with deer, roe deer, and wild boar as the main prey... Fishing and gathering were auxiliary occupations. In general, the Trypillian subsistence strategy was variable, determined by the environment, way of life, and economic traditions of the population of each particular region.

Although there may have been **craftspeople** working to satisfy the requirements of the whole community during the early period, stone and bone working, spinning and weaving, pottery-making were decentralized and done on a household basis. The trend toward centralization, however, is clearly noticeable in the middle and early late periods. During that time, flint processing workshops appeared...

The nature of Trypillian metallurgy remains vague. The high technological level of smithing, which was certainly established by the early Trypillia period, gives reason to assume that the metals were manufactured by professionals. However, no traces of local metalworking facilities have yet been found...

Social and **demographic** interpretations of the Trypillia culture are complicated by the absence of such important sources as cemeteries and the constraint of only a small number of completely excavated settlements. The size and interior of most early Trypillia dwellings are such that they could provide living space for four or five people that is, for a **nuclear family**.

A typical early Trypillia settlement consisted of 7 to 10 **dwellings** which were inhabited by a community of 50 – 70 people, or an extended family consisting of several related nuclear families, who sometimes shared a dwelling. In the middle period and the beginning of the late period, the Tripolian household was made up of two to four nuclear families living in a single house. A Trypillian settlement with several dozen houses was probably populated by a clan...

The process of decline must have been caused by **immanent internal factors** of the culture's **subsistence economy**. Even in the early period, the vast areas of land available to the Trypillians determined the extensive character of their farming. Their technical and technological base remained unchanged through the centuries and this economic system ultimately proved unable to cope with the natural population growth [25].

Questions:

1. What was the basis of the Trypillian economy?
2. How did people organize the craft production?
3. What was the Trypillian subsistence economy like?

The Scythians (the 7th – 3rd BC)

The most important animal was without doubt the horse. It provided not only meat, which was cooked in many different ways, but also the milk from which butter, cheese and in particular **koumiss**, were produced. Furthermore the horse was used for riding and as a beast of burden, and directed by a skillful rider to bite and kick could even become a "**weapon**" in battle...

Whereas livestock-breeding was prevalent in the southern region of the steppe, agriculture and horticulture were well developed in the forest steppe to the north. Conditions here were favourable for this, since the forest steppe lies in the zone of very fertile soil consisting of various kinds of **black earth**...

In Scythian times **the forest steppe** and the steppe comprised a single political unit. The forest steppe was the home of the agricultural Scythians, and of related tribes assumed to be of different ethnic origin who had been conquered by the invading **nomads**. Through them the forest steppe became the "granary" of the nomad princes, who as trade magnates were the economic exploiters of the corn trade with Greece, no doubt the source of the enormous riches which filled the tombs of the **nomadic nobility**.

In Scythia anyone possessing only one **wagon** was considered poor. The owner was called an "eight-footer" after the legs of his two horses.

A rich Scythian owned about 80 such wagons, as we gather from a story by Lucian. Even this is paltry compared to the "wagon parks" of the medieval nomads.

Large numbers of wagons are also found in Scythian tombs, no doubt for the purpose of transporting the dead into the next world [16].

Questions:

1. What role did the horse play in the Scythian social and economic life?
2. In what way did the agricultural Scythians differ from the nomadic ones?
3. How did the prestige economy display itself in the Scythian society?

**The Greeks in the northern Black Sea coast and Crimea
(since the 8th century BC)**

Trade was the origin of the Greek **settlements**... and attracted population according to the commercial advantages of its position. Chersonese is a possible exception but it was trade that kept even Chersonese alive in later times. No doubt some of the colonists carried on agriculture and had their farms nearby, but the main part of them exploited commercially the lands.

Polybius gives us a summary of the Euxine **trade**. The chief exports were cattle and slaves, less important were honey, wax and dried fish, of corn he says that according to the harvests it was imported and exported: to this list we must add hides, also salt, timber, some precious stones including amber, drugs and perhaps gold.

Of the **slaves** the greater part came from **Asia Minor** whose natives were peculiarly fitted for servitude; the Getae also furnished a large supply. Scythian slaves are not specially common; less adaptable than the Asiatics they would be more suitable for outdoor labour than for personal service...

The Greek **tombs** dating from the early centuries of our era shew a fair prosperity all along the Scythian coast; even in a little town like Gorgippia the guild of shipowners could, under royal patronage, set up a temple and statues to Poseidon; but with the approach of fresh tribes things again changed for the worse [2].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast the Greek society and the Scythian one.
2. Describe the role of trade in the Greek economy.
3. How were slaves treated by Greeks?

Theme 2. The economy and society in the age of Kyivan Rus and Galicia-Volhynia

The Khazars (the 6th – 10th centuries)

Turkic-speaking **people** originally derived from several multiethnic and multilingual **tribes** in the mid-6th to mid-7th centuries. The Khazars were a tribal **confederation**... The khagan was **the ruler of the Khazars**. The khagan had a sacral character and was held responsible for **the fortunes** of the Khazars which could result in his ritual **murder** under adverse circumstances. The actual **government** was run by the beg (sometimes translated as **king**). At the end of the 8th or early 9th centuries, the Khazar khagan (ruler) and **the royal clan** converted to Judaism. Although the Khazars led a **seminomadic** existence (they wintered in **cities** but in spring and summer remained on **the steppe**), they nonetheless were noted for building **cities** and creating a large trading empire. Derbent became an important trading center where Muslim traders brought silver, **pottery**, glass, and beads in exchange for Khazar **furs**, which they obtained as **tribute** from the Slavic **tribes** and the Volga Bulgars. In 965 the Rus' leader **Sviatoslav** of Kiev **destroyed** Sarkel, the Khazars' **capital**. Military and **economic** pressure from the Pechenegs and the Rus undermined **the Khazar state**. After 965 the **Pechenegs** had replaced the **Khazars** as the new power on the **steppe** [19].

Questions:

1. What were the main sources of profit for the Khazars?
2. What were the weak points in the Khazar social organization?

The Rus people (the 10th – 13th centuries)

Kiev was the main **market center** for Rus' **trade** with Byzantium. That **trade** was already being conducted on a regular basis by the reign of **Vladimir**, and it expanded after the Rus' adoption of **Christianity** in 988. During **the eleventh and twelfth** centuries some elements in the pattern of Rus – Byzantine **trade** shifted. Direct princely **participation** in the trade diminished while princes concentrated more on facilitating **commerce** by keeping the **trade** routes open and **secure**. The Rus consistently **exported** fur pelts, wax, **honey**, and **slaves** to Byzantium.

Craft production in Kiev expanded under the influence of **foreign trade** and foreign **master craftsmen** who migrated to Kiev.

Military activity generated **demand** for a range of **weapons** and other products, virtually all of which were **crafted** domestically and generally supplied the needs of **the military forces** of their princes.

Massive **building** projects also provided work for a wide variety of laborers. The artisans of Kiev were not all native **Slavs**. After the collapse of the **Khazar Empire**, skilled workers migrated from its declining cities to Kiev. Particularly after **988**, Byzantine **craftsmen** also came to Kiev to direct the **construction** and decoration of new **cathedrals**, including the Church of the Tithe and the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev [12].

Questions:

1. What were the main characteristics of the Rus trade?
2. Describe the Rus craftspeople.

Pechenegs (the 10th – 11th centuries)

The Pechenegs were a Turkic-speaking **confederation of tribes**. They had a simple **nomadic** socioeconomy, whose main imperative was to find pasturage for the **herds**, a need constantly threatened by the extremes, severe winters and drought, that **periodically ruined** pasturelands.

An important part of the economy of the Pechenegs involved raiding on **trade routes**. The Pechenegs **attacked** traders of the Rus travelling down rivers (esp. at rapids of the Dnieper) through their **territory** on expeditions to Constantinople. The Pechenegs also engaged in **trade** with the Rus and other neighboring **peoples**. The Rus bought cattle, horses, and sheep from them [23].

Questions:

1. What were the main characteristics of the Pechenegs' economy?
2. What was more important for the Pechenegs? Trading or raiding?

The Kumans (also Cumans, Kipchaq, Polovtsi) (the mid-11th – mid-13th centuries)

Turkic-speaking **nomadic people**. **Numerous** khans are noted and indicate the coexistence of a loose **tribal confederation**. This has led **historians** to speculate on the **number** of tribal territorial units, which range from some **5 tribal** zones to 6 to 8 to as many as 11 geographical **groupings**. The **Rus** also drew a distinction between the **"wild"** Kumans, who may not have had

any treaty or **military** ties to the Rus and were largely found along the **Don** and the "**nonwild**" Kumans, who did **cooperate** with the Rus and **inhabited** both sides of the **Dnieper**. Despite the numerous **conflicts** between the Rus and the **Kumans**, their relations were also marked by **alliances** and **intermarriages**.

Some **historians** credit the Kumans with disrupting **trade** to the Black Sea and undermining the **economic** vitality of **Kiev Rus** after the death of **Vladimir Monomakh** in 1125. Other scholars have challenged this accepted view and do not think the southern **trade routes** were greatly affected because the Kumans enjoyed collecting **taxes** from **merchants**. Traffic of **goods** could be **interrupted** but even in the midst of conflict Rus **merchants** could still cross the **steppe**. The Kumans supplied **horses** to the Rus in return for **grain**, textiles, and **weapons**. The Kumans also exported **slaves**, especially to Egypt. They **established towns**, such as Sharukhan, Sugrov, and Balin [9].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast "wild" Cumans with "nonwild" ones.
2. Compare and contrast Cumans and Pechenegs.

**The *chernye klobuki* (Black Hoods), or the Karakalpaks
(the late 11th – mid-12th centuries)**

They were evidently Pechenegs, Torks, and other **nomadic peoples** who had neither moved westward when the Polovtsy appeared nor been assimilated by them. Hostile particularly toward the "wild" Polovtsy, the *chernye klobuki* not only made **peace** with the Kievan **princes**, but occupied lands near the Rus defense outposts on the Ros River. Becoming **semisedentary**, they pursued **agricultural** as well as **pastoral** livelihoods, while also serving as frontier **guards** and supplementary troops for Kievan **campaigns** [12].

Questions:

1. Describe the semisedentary way of life in the Middle Ages with references to the Karakalpak economy as an example.

The Mongols (the mid-13th – mid-15th centuries)

In the 13th century C E various Mongol **tribes** were **united** under the leadership of Genghis Khan and his **descendants**; they created the largest **empire** known to human history. In 1243, Batu Khan **founded** the Kipchak

khanate (or the **Golden Horde**). The Mongol economy over the centuries has been based on herds of **horses** and **sheep**, with seasonal **movement**. The Mongols of today are still a **pastoral** people [23].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast the Mongols with the Pechenegs and the Cumans.

Theme 3. The social and economic state of the Ukrainian lands in the Grand Principality of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland

The diet

It was not uncommon for a **well-off peasant**, of which there were many, to work a **twenty-to-thirty-acre plot**, own one or two horses or oxen, two or three cows, some pigs, and dozens of chickens and geese. An average Ukrainian's daily diet consisted of about 0.6 kilogram of bread and 2.5 liters of beer. Other common foods were **kasha**, cheese, eggs, and, when in season, fruits. Meat was eaten only rarely, usually during major holidays. The diet of the average nobleman was much the same except that his family consumed more meat, and sometimes such delicacies as imported spices, **raisins**, and figs appeared on his table. Sweets were rare and even wealthy noblemen could afford wine only on **festive** occasions. Even in the best of times, many of the poorer peasants and urban laborers went hungry. Because of poor hygienic conditions, the infant **mortality rate** was high and **the median age** was still only about 25 – 30 years [19].

Questions

1. What is the text about?
2. Was the situation better or worse than before?
3. How do you suppose it might influence the psychological state of people?

Sovereign and vassals

The chief task of the sovereign was to organize the defense of the country, and, in order to do this, he had the right to claim military service from every member of the community according to his means. In return for military service, the prince granted lands. Being the real owner of all the land, he could distribute it among his vassals, the great nobles, who, in their turn,

had tenants, and so on, all bound by military service in case of war. Here, as elsewhere, it was only gradually that the idea of conditional land tenure gave way to the principle of private property in land [26].

Questions:

1. What is the text about?
2. How could this order be called?
3. Why did the idea of conditional land tenure give way to the private land property?

The nobility

In Ukraine, while it was still a part of the Grand Principality, the most important component of the nobility were the twenty to thirty princely or magnate families that traced their descent from the once-sovereign princes of the Riurikid or Gediminas **dynasties**.

The wealthiest among them, the Ostrozky family, had vast holdings that included about 30 % of all the land in Volhynia (14,000 sq. km) on which there were 100 towns and over 1 300 villages. Other rich and illustrious families were the Sanhusko, Chartorysky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Zaslavsky, and Chetvertynsky. These families dominated most of the high offices in the Grand Principality and traces of their former sovereign rights survived in their right to lead their own troops under their personal banners or to be judged only by the grand prince, not by local officials.

The vast majority of the nobility, later called by the Polish term **szlachta**, consisted of those whose privileges derived primarily from military service.

Most numerous were the lowest levels of the nobility. Thousands of families, some recently emerged from peasant or **burgher** backgrounds, obtained noble status by serving as cavalrymen in campaigns, castle or frontier guards, or armed servitors of the magnates. Often they had just enough land to support themselves, and their life-style differed little from that of peasants. Especially in Galicia, whole villages were inhabited by poor noblemen with names like Kulchytsky, Iavorsky, Chaikovsky, and Vytvytsky [26].

Questions:

1. Was the impact of the military service important in the social formation of the Szlachta?
2. Why was the nobility so numerous?

The first Lithuanian Statutes and gentry

This first Lithuanian **Statute** (1529) had only thirteen paragraphs... The third treats the privileges of the gentry... The final form of the statute was undoubtedly the result of tense struggles between the great nobles and the lesser gentry. We distinctly see in it how the **privileges** of the latter are insisted upon. A member of the gentry class could not be imprisoned without a public trial. He could not be deprived of his estate unless there was sufficient ground for punishment. His dependents were exempted from state **taxation**... The second Lithuanian Statute was edited in 1566, augmented and revised, but it remained the same in principle as the first one [26].

Questions:

1. What was the first Lithuanian statutes' primary goal?
2. How and because of what did the state of gentry change?

The Catholic church

The Catholic church soon became the largest **landowner** in Galicia, because of royal generosity. The Catholic church stood in the forefront of attempts to undermine the old Orthodox order. Monasteries of the **Franciscan** and **Dominican orders** served a rapidly growing Catholic population [24].

Question:

1. How and why did church enrich itself?

The Ukrainian peasantry

The great mass of the population in Ukraine was **peasants**... The country population in old Ukraine was subdivided into the free peasants, who were small land-holders; the half-free peasants, or serfs, bound by certain duties to the estates of their landlords; and finally, the slaves. Development tended towards the leveling of the differences between the sub-divisions, the position of slaves being very much improved in the course of centuries while on the other hand, the free peasants gradually but severely having their freedom curtailed.

In the beginning of the sixteenth century, slavery still existed in Ukraine under the Lithuanian princes. The slaves were mostly employed in agriculture. Some of the slaves were attached to the manor; others had their own homesteads in the estate. In the Statute of 1529 we find that the origin of

slavery was the same as in the Kyivan state... The same statute also provided some possibility for the slaves to buy their freedom. By the Statute of 1566 the **commutation** of the death sentence to **slavery** was abolished, and the Statute of 1588 abolished slavery altogether, former slaves being put on an equal footing with serfs... Most of them were attached to the land. They had to pay the landlord some **tribute**, mostly **in kind**, and their work on his land constituted the chief resource of labour on the **estates** [26].

Questions:

1. Why was Szlachta interested in developing serfdom?
2. How and why did the status of peasants change?
3. What were the origins of slavery in Kyivan Rus?

The Voloky Ustav

The most common type of peasant settlement was a farm, or a **cluster** of several farms occupied by the members of the same family or close relatives. The quantity of arable land that such a settlement cultivated varied much according to local conditions. This type of peasant settlement was also considered as a unit for taxation and the **imposition** of other duties. About the middle of the sixteenth century an important land reform was carried out in order to **render** taxation more uniform. According to this new arrangement, by the law of 1557 a certain definite measure of arable land became the unit for taxation purposes. This was the voloka, equivalent to about fifty-five acres. Every peasant group in possession of a voloka of land was bound to pay a certain tax in money and produce, as well as in labour service, the latter being two days a week. The peasants were not yet definitely deprived of liberty of movement and bound to the soil. This law was applied only in certain parts of Ukraine, mostly in the north, whereas in the south old customs were in force until after the Union of Lublin (1569) [26].

Questions:

1. What are the text's three main points?
2. How and why was the Ustav implemented?

Agriculture

The agrarian systems based on fallowing and cultivation with the animal-drawn **plow** derive from earlier systems also based on **fallowing**, but that used the **ard** for cultivation.

Like the **ard-based system**, these systems are based on the combination of rainfed cereal growing and animal raising. The **cereals** occupy the arable lands where they **alternate** with a fallow period forming a short-term **rotation**, while the livestock draw their subsistence from peripheral natural **pastures** and play a central role in fieldwork and in renewing the fertility of the cereal-growing lands. But the new systems are clearly distinguished from their **predecessors** by the use of more powerful means of transport and equipment for working the soil. Wheeled carts take the place of the packsaddle, and the plow, contrary to the ard that it replaces, makes possible true plowing [13].

Questions:

1. What are the text's main points?
2. What were the advantages of the new system?

Liberty of townsmen

The most indispensable was personal liberty. Without liberty, that is to say, without the power to come and go, to do business, to sell goods, a power not enjoyed by serfdom, trade would be impossible. Thus they claimed it, simply for the advantages which it conferred, and nothing was further from the mind of the bourgeoisie than any idea of freedom as a natural right; in their eyes it was merely a useful one. Besides, many of them possessed it de facto; they were immigrants, who had come from too far off for their lord to be traced and who, since their serfdom could not be presumed, necessarily passed for free, although born of unfree parents. But the fact had to be transformed into a right [14].

Question:

1. What was the economic role of freedom in urban centres?

Magdeburg Law

As they grew in size and self-confidence, major towns acquired the highly prized Magdeburg Law from Polish kings and Lithuanian grand princes. Modelled on the administration of the German city of Magdeburg... In 1356 Lviv, in 1374 Kamianets in Podilia, in 1432 Lutsk in Volhynia, and in 1494 Kiev obtained Magdeburg Law, thereby freeing themselves from the interference of royal or princely officials.

Despite the theoretical **equality** of all citizens subject to **Magdeburg Law**, sharp socioeconomic distinctions existed among a town's inhabitants. Rich, patrician families, such as the forty or fifty who formed the **elite** in Lviv, totally dominated town government. Small merchants and **tradesmen** formed the **middle stratum** [19].

Questions:

1. What are the main points of the text?
2. How does the text correspond with the previous one?

Fairs and markets

Though the **fairs** were subsequent to the markets, they were not connected with them by any link and indeed present the most complete contrast to them. The aim of the local markets was to supply the provisions necessary for daily life to the population settled in the district. This explains their being held weekly, their very limited circle of attraction and the restriction of their activity to small retail operations. The fairs, on the contrary, were periodical meeting-places for professional merchants. They were centres of exchange and especially of **wholesale exchange**, and set out to attract the greatest possible number of people and of good, independent of all local consideration. They may perhaps be compared with international exhibitions, for they excluded nothing and nobody... Moreover, it was impossible to hold them more than once, or at most twice a year in the same place, so great was the necessary preparation involved. It is true that the radius of most of the fairs was limited to a more or less extensive region [14].

Questions:

1. What are the main points of the text?
2. What do you think the origins of the large fairs in Ukraine were?

Commerce and voyages

In an age when local famines were continual, one had only to buy a very small quantity of grain cheaply in regions where it was abundant, to realize fabulous profits, which could then be increased by the same methods. Thus **speculations**, which is the starting-point in this kind of business, largely contributed to the foundation of the first commercial fortunes. The **savings**

of a little **pedlar**, a **sailor**, a **boatman**, or a **docker**, furnished him with quite enough capital, if only he knew how to use it. It might also happen that a landowner would invest a part of his income in **maritime commerce**... In these cases landed capital unquestionably contributed to the formation of liquid capital [14].

Questions:

1. What are three main points of the text?
2. How was the early commerce connected with sea travels?
3. Did moral and business have to correlate with each other?

Piracy in the Black Sea

Angelo di Raffaele (an Italian pirate, 1402) **preyed** with great success on Muslim shipping, passing on 10 percent of his take to Genoese officials at Constantinople. (...)

Sinop (the 14th century) had excellent **harbor** on the Black Sea's southern coast. Turkish invaders took Sinop from the Byzantine Empire in 1214, and its emirs frequently promoted or took part in piracy. In 1313 and 1314, Ghazi, Lord of Sinop, personally led attacks on Genoese ships near Caffa (Feodosia) in the Crimea.

In 1340, a Genoese **counter-raid** from Caffa (Feodosia) in the Crimea sank 10 **pirate galleys** and murdered their **crews** [15].

Questions:

1. What role did piracy play in the medieval economy?

The craft guilds

It was necessary to institute a system which protected both the artisan who **manufactured** and sold and the customer who bought. In every country this was secured by an organization which, in spite of innumerable differences of detail, was everywhere based on the same principle: that of craft guilds. It was in it that city economy found its most general and characteristic expression...

The majority of modern **scholars** rightly consider that free association provides a more likely solution to the problem. From the end of the eleventh century we do indeed see the urban artisans forming *fraternities* (*fraternitates*, *caritates*) on the basis of their professions. For this their model would be

the merchant guilds and the religious societies formed around the churches and monasteries... The pressing necessity to stand by one another, so as to resist the competition of newcomers, must have made itself felt from the very beginning of industrial life...

When the **artisans** began to move into the nascent towns, the **castellans** or the **mayors** who were established there naturally required them to submit to their authority... Now, it was obviously impossible to enact laws relating to products without including the producers, since the only means of ensuring the good quality of the former was to supervise the latter. The most **efficacious** way of doing this was to form them into groups according to professions and subject them to the control of the municipal authority. Thus the spontaneous tendency which drove the artisans into corporations was reinforced by the interests of administrative control...

There is no doubt that this compulsory regimentation of artisans was primarily designed in the interest of the artisans themselves. To protect the consumer against **fraud** and adulteration it was sufficient to regulate industrial practices and to supervise sales. The professional monopoly enjoyed by the guilds was rather a danger to the buyers, who were completely at their mercy. But for the producers it offered the inestimable advantage of freedom from competition, and it was no doubt a concession made at their demand by the legal authorities... Their only weapon against those who were not affiliated to them was the boycott, that is to say, brute-force, a precarious and inadequate weapon.

Thus the origin of **guilds** is traceable to the action of two factors: legal authority and voluntary association. The first intervened on behalf of the public, i.e., of the consumers; the second is the result of the initiative of the artisans themselves, i.e., of the producers... In its essentials the medieval craft may be defined as an industrial corporation enjoying the monopoly of practicing a particular profession, in accordance with regulations sanctioned by public authority...

The members of each corporation were divided into categories subordinate to one another, **masters, apprentices and journeymen**. The masters were the dominant class, upon whom the other two depended. They were the proprietors of small workshops, owning their raw materials and tools. Thus the manufactured article belonged to them, together with all profits from its sale. The apprentices were initiated into the trade under their direction, for

no one was admitted to the craft unless thoroughly proficient. Finally, the journeymen were paid workmen who had completed their apprenticeship, but had not yet risen to the rank of master... Each **workroom** was also a shop where the buyer was face to face with the producer [14].

Questions:

1. What are three main points of the text?
2. Why did guilds appear?
3. What was typical of the craft guilds' organization for the period?
4. What role did the craft guilds play in economy?
5. Were the guilds efficient or not concerning development of market relations?

The Crimean Khanate

After 1475, when the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars defeated the Italians, the Muslims merely replaced the Italians as the major slave merchants in the Crimea...

From 1468, the time of the first recorded Tatar raid in the northern steppe, until the end of the seventeenth century Tatar **raiders** made almost annual **forays** into Slavic agricultural communities in the north searching for captives to sell as slaves. It is understandable that Slavic historians describe these events with dismay; yet viewed from a less emotional or nationalistic perspective, these slave raids can be seen as a very successful economic activity that produced the means by which the Tatars developed a lively urban and cultural society.

Added to the profits gained from the capture and sale of slaves, ransom (the sale of the captives back to representatives of their native lands) became a lucrative offshoot of the slave trade. (...)

Although the khans did not possess sufficient land to permit them economic control of the khanate, they did have large financial resources. These derived from a combination of the tribute monies from Muscovy and Poland, from their percentage of all **captives** brought to the Crimea, and from the large donations of various sorts they received from the Ottomans.

The Crimean economy depended primarily upon trade, the greatest part of which was **the slave trade** [3].

Questions:

1. What role did slavery play in the Crimean Khanate economy?
2. Why could the Crimean economy not change into a more peaceful one?

On the origins of the Ukrainian Cossacks

Hrushevsky begins his text with an account of the origins of the Cossacks. He sees them as growing out of settlements of foragers. Because of Mongol devastation and subsequent Tatar raids, the Eastern Ukrainian lands were relatively uninhabited. But for that very reason these lands were rich in animals and vegetation and attracted a colonizing population which ventured out to fish, hunt, trap and gather honey. These foragers began banding together for protection and then raiding the Tatars. The raids "turned imperceptibly into military campaigns". By mid-century one can speak of almost continual border warfare, and the Cossacks took control of the lower reaches of the Dnipro and the steppes [4].

Questions:

1. Why, according to Hrushevskyi, did the Cossacks appear?
2. What new might be included into the text to improve its content?

Theme 4. The social and economic development of Ukraine in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The Union of Lublin, 1569

3. The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are one **indivisible** and uniform body and also one uniform **Commonwealth**, which grew and **consolidated** into one nation from two states and nations...

13. The currency both in Poland and in Lithuania is to be uniform and equal in weight and **bullion**, the number of coins [**minted** from one weight unit] and the **inscriptions** on coins. His Royal Majesty and his **descendants** will be obliged to carry this to effect.

14. His Royal Majesty shall **condescend** to **nullify** all the **tolls** and **duties** both in Poland and in Lithuania, on land and water routes, called by whatever names, both nobility's, **ecclesiastical** and municipal ones. From now on, no tolls should be **perpetually** taken from the **clergy**, from **lay persons** of noble rank and from their subjects, concerning whatever **wares** of own **manufacture**.

No merchant tolls are to be excluded from this and there are to be no **collusion** with **merchants** to the **detriment** and **concealment** of old usual Royal **customs** both in Poland and in Lithuania.

14. ...both the Poles in Lithuania and the Lithuanians in Poland are to be perpetually allowed to **acquire** property and hold it according to the law of the land where the property is located [27].

Questions:

1. What are the primary goals of the text?
2. How is nation understood in the text?
3. What is nation for authors?
4. Explain why merchants are not given the preferences.
5. Was there any sort of competition between two classes, i.e. Szlachta and merchantry?

Magnates and their economy

The de facto rulers of *Ukraina* were the magnate families, which not only owned great expanses of land, but were responsible for the defence and administration of the country. Individuals such as Vyshnyvetsky, Nemyrych, Czartoryski and Koniecpolski, were the "**appanage princes**" of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) and were subject neither to the Sejm (Diet) nor to royal authority. These magnates administered their lands through agents who were responsible to them, while the economic exploitation of the magnate latifundia was in the hands of **leaseholders** or *orendars* [22].

Questions:

1. What does latifundia mean in the text? How was the latifundia used by magnates?
2. Why does Stepan Velychenko call magnates "appanage princes"?
3. Explain why magnates were so powerful in Ukraine.

The population growing and defensive incapacity

By the 1640's the Podillia and Kyiv provinces had a minimal average population **density** of 11 persons per sq. km, while that of Bratslav had a minimum of 21 per sq. km. These lands **attracted** an ever growing number of people primarily because of the much lower levels of labour **obligations**

and monetary and obrok (payments in kind) rent. However, these favourable conditions were **offset** by the fact that *Ukraina* was open to the **devastating** annual **incursions** of the Crimean Tatars.

The defensive **incapacity** of these lands was primarily a result of the "magnate system". Individually powerful and having at their service **retinues** of up to 6 000 well armed men, the magnates, had they banded together, would have provided a respectable defence force. But given the character of relationships among themselves and their political beliefs, the only common interest which the magnates had was to keep royal power limited [22].

Questions:

1. What devastated the Ukrainian lands?
2. What does the "magnate system" mean in this excerpt?
3. Why did magnates not unite in the face of the Tatar threat?

The tensional situation in the Sloboda Ukraine

It may be **asserted** that the military **insecurity** of Ukraine was a more important reason for economic **exploitation** than class conflict. Economic relations on the local level were characterized by the fact that the *orendar*, in face of the **prevailing** insecurity, was out to make as much as he could as fast as possible. Although the contract between the *orendar* and the magnate usually did involve some **stipulations** concerning the rates and levels of the obligations upon the people, the fact that the *orendar* by the same agreement was usually given full legal rights over these people meant that the *orendar* was able to increase the **rates** of obligations and duties at his **discretion**.

Unlike in the more western areas of the Korona ("The Crown", the Polish half of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth), these increases were not only **imposed** at faster rate, but were imposed upon people who either considered themselves not subject to such duties or who were unable to understand the **rationale** for such duties. As sons of settlers who had come to Ukraine under the terms of *sloboda* (freedom from labour obligations and rents, promised by the landowners to new settlers for a stated period of years), they had grown up in conditions of complete economic freedom. Thus in Ukraine there prevailed a situation where levels of exploitation were continually increasing because of the insecurity, but the settled population was **reluctant** to accept passively such unprecedented duties [22].

Questions:

1. Who were *orendars*?
2. What problem did the orendar have with the sloboda?
3. Why did magnates lease their lands out?

The Registered Cossacks

Within such an **environment** lived the Registered Cossacks. Initially organized under the authority of individual *starostas* (governors of frontier **fortresses**), in 1583 they were **constituted** as part of the royal army. In return for their service these Cossacks were guaranteed certain rights and privileges, and, it was this legal **recognition** of rights and privileges which differentiated the Registered Cossacks from all the other Cossacks. It must be understood, however, that the registration of the Cossacks split them more or less along an already existing differentiation. The Registered Cossacks tended to be selected from what may be called the more "conservative" element. These men had houses, families and property. Those falling outside the register tended to represent the more "radical-egalitarian" Cossacks. However, it is important to understand that the basic desire of the latter group was to enter the register thereby **obtaining** all **benefits** and guarantees **inherent** in the status of Registered Cossacks. These divisions were not as **rigid** in real life as they were on paper; in reality, the situation was **fluid**.

One of the most important rights of the Registered Cossacks was his right to own land. But although in theory he held land by **virtue** of being in the register, or because he possessed a royal charter to his land, in reality the Registered Cossack held his land at the discretion of the local magnate.

The Registered Cossacks were all **well off**, while some were actually wealthy. Khmelnytsky in 1647 declared his total **assets** to be 1 000 florins, and he is usually described as being a "middle class" Cossack. In reference to the Registered Cossacks, the Polish Hetman Potocki wrote that they were sufficiently well off to enable them to serve in the army without pay [22].

Questions:

1. Who were the Registered Cossacks?
2. Why did most of the Cossacks desire to be in register?
3. Stepan Velychenko writes that all of the Registered Cossacks were well off. What do you think the main sources of their wealth were?

Folwarki

To produce food more efficiently and in greater quantities, nobles began to transform their land holdings into commercially oriented food plantations or estates called *folwarki* (*filvarky* in Ukrainian). It no longer made economic sense for them to collect slowly increasing rents from small, inefficient, peasant holdings. Instead they tried to gain direct control of the peasants' lands so as to **amalgamate** them into their estates and, in place of rents, they demanded ever more free labor from their peasants [19].

Questions:

1. What were *folwarki*? What stratum founded them?
2. Give reasons for creating *folwarki*.
3. Compare and contrast the *folwarki* and Cossacks' farmsteads.

Theme 5. The social and economic state of the Ukrainian lands from the middle seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries

Ukraine in 1648, on the eve of the Khmelnytskyi uprising

Theories that economic **downturns** or economic downturns after periods of expansion (J-curve) **engender** revolts do not apply to Ukraine. While an economic crisis **encompassed** much of Europe in the 1620s and the sixteenth-century demographic and economic expansion in the western and northern territories of the Commonwealth had begun to **sputter**, no slowdown occurred in the Ukrainian lands. Some of this expansion resulted from the settlement and cultivation of new lands, a process similar to the one that occurred in Hungary in the eighteenth century...

Although the degree to which **grains** were exported from the Dnipro Basin to the Vistula Basin and across the Baltic is still debated, the **conversion** of the Vistula Basin, including western Ukraine, into a grain producing and exporting zone had great impact on the economy of the Dnipro Basin. The economic model of the Polish territories – **manorial** estates worked by **serf labor** from which noble landlord had the right to export agricultural products directly – spread eastward in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century [20].

Questions:

1. Why did slowdown not occur in the Ukrainian lands?

2. What countries are located within the Vistula Basin?
3. Do you agree (partly agree or disagree) that the social causes played a more significant role than economic ones? Explain why.

The Ukraine-Muscovy trade during the Khmelnytskyi uprising (1648 – 1657)

Despite significant grain production both in the Ukraine and southern Muscovy, however, relatively little grain was traded across the border after the 1650s...

The rise in Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's power and his declaration of autonomy did not **apparently** affect traders crossing the southern **border**. Repeated **assurances** were exchanged in 1648 and 1649 that traders should move freely across the **frontier**, providing they were armed with appropriate documents...

Very soon, however, a number of towns (in Muscovy) reported that "Lithuanian" **purchases** were creating shortfalls on local markets (...)

Orders to **cease** sales to foreigners might easily have political and **retaliatory** motivation, as well as being motivated by need. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was negotiating with the Ottoman Empire in 1650, the year of many of these documents, and war seemed **imminent**. A similar **decree** from further north dating to 1650 states "za ikh mnogii nepravdy i grubosti im prodavat ne dovedetsia" (for their great faithlessness and **churlishness**, one must not sell to them). Khmelnytskyi expressed a similar **desire**, a few years later, to **resume** the taxation of traders from Muscovy on a par with other foreigners.

Whatever effect grain prices or periodic **restrictions** on export sales may have had on grain trade between southern Muscovy and the Hetmanate, another powerful **disincentive** existed to such **traffic**: the structure and regulation of alcohol sales on the eastern side of the border. The Muscovite government held a monopoly over the sale of alcoholic **beverages** within its own borders... Given the high prices on alcohol set by the state, state-run **stills** were also highly **lucrative**, with **profits** that have been estimated as high as 100 percent; a more conservative estimate for vodka production alone is 35 percent. (...)

After mid-century, both southern Muscovy and the Hetmanate rapidly became important sources of privately **distilled** liquor [18].

Questions:

1. What was the economic policy of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi?
2. What does it mean: "Orders to cease sales to foreigners might easily have political and retaliatory motivation"?
3. Why was the alcohol trade so important and lucrative?

The Muscovite presence in the Hetmanate during the period of the "Ruin" (1657 – 1686)

Once the monopoly was in place, the Muscovite government's interest in the alcohol trade across the border focused on the collection of the customs duties. The regular customs tariff on alcohol (two altyn for each chetvert' of grain used in making the vodka) amounted to about a 12.5 percent tax on grain purchased for southern markets... Illegally imported alcohol, warned a decree of 1665, would be confiscated. The same threat was repeated in 1675, directed especially at the Ukraine. (...)

Finally, the Muscovite military presence in the Hetmanate **absorbed** both Ukrainian and Muscovite grain **supplies**. Muscovite **troops** appeared in the Ukraine in **considerable** numbers after 1663. After 1666, supplies to maintain them were provided by the Muscovite government on an irregular basis. ... When they became larger and **permanent**, these Muscovite **garrisons** made more serious demands. In the early years of the *Malorosiyskiy prikaz*, these troops were supposed to be maintained by the Ukrainian towns where they were stationed. Kiev, with an urban population of about 1,200 households, was to have a Russian garrison of 5,000 men; Pereiaslav with 300 urban households, was to have 2,000 Russians, and the Chernihiv garrison, 1,200 men ... Again, small **shipments** forced Muscovites to buy food on local markets. In 1669 and 1670, calculations suggest that Russian troops were trying to purchase about 1,500 tons of extra grain near Kiev. These shortfalls were unpredictable [18].

Questions:

1. By what ways did Muscovy exhaust the economy of the Hetmanate?
2. What is *Malorosiyskiy prikaz*?
3. How do you think the population would act to protect its interests under so hard economic circumstances?

The Hetmanate during the rule of Hetmans Ivan Samoilovych (1672 – 1686) and Ivan Mazepa (1686 – 1709), Ivan Skoropadskyi (1709 – 1722)

The last **decades** of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth were characterized by a large and intensive **expansion** of trade in the Left-Bank Ukraine. A number of factors contributed towards this development. First, the Western European market had been **starved** of Ukrainian raw materials because of the **disruption** of commercial relations during the period of the "Ruin" and was **anxious** to resume trade. ... Second, because there was free trade with foreign countries... Finally, the growth of a money economy, of merchant capital, and large-scale landholding in the Left-Bank Ukraine...

The development of a money economy and the growing concentration of productive forces had already begun in the seventeenth century, during the rule of Hetmans Ivan Samoilovych and Ivan Mazepa and was a process **particularly** characteristic of the northern areas of the Hetmanate – the Starodub, Chernihiv, and, to some extent, the Nizhyn **regiments**. There, either through purchase or **coercion**, large estates, and with them many industrial **concerns** such as **mills, distilleries, mines** and **potash** works, came into the hands of the leading representatives of the Cossack *starshyna* (officer class) – who were also active traders – and the **burghers**...

During the relative peace under Mazepa "merchant trade" was in a "**flourishing** state", as Bantysh-Kamenskii noted. However, the new **circumstances** meant that notwithstanding the 1709 **debacle**, trade developed **briskly**, especially in the first half of Skoropadskyi's rule, that is, up to around 1714.

Turning to an examination of Ukrainian trade it should be stressed that although the foundation of the Ukrainian and Russian economies in the eighteenth century was the same – namely, agriculture – "the products of the Ukrainian economy had already for a few centuries been known abroad ... [whereas] the Russian agricultural economy had only started on that **path**". As an exporter and importer... the Hetmanate was closely **tied** to Austria, Germany, and Poland, which served as the chief markets for Ukrainian products, and exports from the Ukraine to other lands such as France and Holland also moved through these countries [8].

Questions:

1. What factors contributed to the development of the economy of Hetmanate?

2. Explain the words: "the products of the Ukrainian economy had already for a few centuries been known abroad."
3. Why do you think Hetmans did not coin their own money?

The mercantilist policy of Peter I in the field of trade and commerce

Although the tsar attempted to **interfere** with Ukrainian commerce before the Battle of Poltava, his efforts were largely unsuccessful because of the Hetmanate's autonomy. The Russian administrative structure in the Ukraine was weak and Hetmanate officials simply ignored **edicts** which they considered damaging to the economy. For instance, in 1703 an edict was issued which prohibited Ukrainian merchants from exporting **hemp** abroad and ordered them to trade with Russia instead. The Hetman administration paid no attention to this edict and trade with Riga and Breslau continued. After Poltava, however, the situation changed. The Hetmanate's autonomy was restricted and there was now a large occupation army charged with enforcing Russia's regulations.

The fact of the matter is that despite Peter's **integrationist** drive, the Ukraine was considered a foreign, even **hostile entity** and economic policy reflected this perception. An excellent example of this thinking was **Chancellor Osterman's** suggestion that the Ukraine should be **flooded** with **debased copper** currency. From a **mercantilist** point of view this meant treating the Ukraine as a completely foreign country to be exploited to the maximum [8].

Questions:

1. What was the edict of 1703? And what effect did it have?
2. How did Peter I use the incident of Poltava battle?
3. Explain why Ukraine was considered a foreign and hostile entity.
4. Make a guess how the debased copper currency might affect the Ukrainian economy and society.

The deurbanization and "peasantization" of the Left-Bank Ukrainian economy

In the wake of the arrival of these powerful Russian figures, numerous Russian merchants and traders, from the Moscow and Kaluga provinces in particular, flocked to the Ukraine. Indeed, in this period the Ukraine was viewed as an Eldorado, a place where fortunes could be made easily and quickly by **skullduggery**.

Comparing data of the seventeenth century with those of the late eighteenth, it is clear that throughout the eighteenth century a process of deurbanization had occurred in the Left-Bank Ukraine. Examining some individual towns we see, for example, that in 1654 Myrhorod had 817 **households**, but by 1767 only 147; Lokhvytsi declined from 523 to 163 households in the same period, and Poltava from 1333 to 600. (If we multiply by five or six, we have some idea of what these figures mean in terms of the total population of the given towns.) Because important sectors of the urban economy were damaged, namely, trade, the town population dropped...

Thus, in the light of 1832 data, Russians represented 81 percent of the merchants in the province of Chernihiv and 63 percent in Poltava... In short, Petrine policies played a large role in the "**peasantization**" of the Ukrainian social structure with all that this meant for the Ukrainians' subsequent national development [8].

Questions:

1. Why did Russian merchants flock into Ukraine?
2. What does "peasantization" mean?
3. Was there any alternative for the urban population, but to turn to peasantry?

Theme 6. The Ukrainian lands in the Russian and Austrian Empires from the late eighteenth to the middle nineteenth centuries

Population growth in the Dnieper Ukraine

The Ukraine, with its large territory and population and unparalleled combination of rich agricultural land and **bountiful** industrial mineral resources, was ideally situated for economic growth in the nineteenth century (...)

Throughout the nineteenth century, an extraordinary rate of growth resulted in a rapid expansion of the Ukraine's population. According to A. G. Rashin, whose estimates are based on *reviziya* data, the nine *guberniyas* of the Ukraine increased in population from 8.7 to 13.6 million between 1811 and 1863 (a 55 percent growth) and then to 23.4 million by 1897 (a 72 percent growth). Over the same periods, the **percentage** growth for the *guberniyas* of European Russia was 46 percent and 52 percent respectively, which means that the nine Ukrainian *guberniyas* increased their share of the European Russian population from 21 percent in 1811 to 25 percent in 1897...

This very rapid rate of population growth for the Ukraine was due to a combination of high natural increase (i.e., the excess of births over deaths) and a large volume of **net in-migration** [1].

Questions:

1. Why was Ukraine ideally situated for economic growth in the nineteenth century?
2. Make a guess how the huge in-migration contributed the economic growth.
3. Who migrated? Why did people migrate in the Russian Empire? Where did the migrants settle most?

Serfdom in Russia and the Dnieper Ukraine

Serfdom in Russia was based on the principle of almost complete **denial** of any rights to the serf. The serf was **deprived** of human honor and **dignity**, and therefore had no right to **appeal** to a **court** for **slander** (...)

But despite everything, the Ukrainian peasants never lost their feeling of human dignity, and never **acquiesced** to the condition of **servitude**. Hence the need for controlled relations between landlords and serfs, to prevent or weaken **eruptions** of opposition. Indicative of this were the so-called "Inventory Rules" introduced by the Governor-General of Kyiv, Bibikov in the 1840's. According to these rules, every **estate** had to be described in detail, with an estimate of the labor of serfs in all categories (...)

Significantly, over 80 % of all serfs belonged to estates which held 50 and more serfs, and over 37 % to estates which held 1,000 and more serfs each. This shows that the dominating feature of **landlord** possession was the huge estate, typical of an agricultural economy of slave labor in a colony. According to the ukase of December 12, 1801, a serf desiring to purchase his liberty had not only to pay for his personal liberty, but also purchase his land, which had previously been taken away from him. After 1826, personal liberty could be purchased without land.

The obligations of a serf to the landlord consisted of two main forms: *panshchyna*, labor for the master, and *obrok*, rent, or the product of his labor in the form of produce or money...

In Ukraine, labor for the master was the dominant form of serfdom, **tenancy** with payment of rent being infrequent...

According to **compilations** of P. Maslov, the number of tenants paying rent reached 16.7 % in the Left Bank and Slobidska Ukraine, 6.5 % in the steppe region, while it was only 1 % in the Right Bank region. The number of serfs who gave labor was (regions): Poltava, 98.86 %, Chernihiv, 97.44 %, Katerynoslav, 99.8 %. There were 524 villages of rent-paying State serfs in 1851, whose population was 182 thousand, about 6 % of all serfs in this category [7].

Questions:

1. What were the main obligations of serfs?
2. How did the serfdom affect economy and society?

The Ukrainian industry and Russian interests

Various trades and home industries had already existed during the Hetmanate period (1649 – 1764), and factory industries had made a start... Some home industries, in the nature of peasant **handicrafts**, produced goods having a wide market: **rugs** of Kharkiv county...; **lace** and **linen** of Izyum;... **tablecloths** and **towels** from Krolevets near Chernihiv; **fishing nets** for the Azov Sea of Oster;... and many others. Industrial production also reached wide proportions. **Weaving** of **woolens** was an old and highly developed industry of Ukraine. **Looms** (for weaving cloth) were standard equipment in most **households** (...)

O. Ohloblyn gives an accurate estimate of the situation which came about as a result of an advanced and stronger economic system being **conquered** by a weaker and under-developed system: "The foundation of the Ukrainian and Russian economy of the 18th century was the same: rural agriculture. But at a time when the products of the Ukrainian economy were already, for a few centuries, known abroad, having travelled a beaten path there, the Russian agricultural economy had only just started on that path. Russian commercial capital, taking a freer look at Europe through a window just opened, should have taken **pains** to close some doors, primarily to independent Ukrainian trade, in order to keep out **drafts detrimental** to itself. Russian industry, young and weak, could not alone compete with the old and strong Western European industry for the Ukrainian market. The interests of Russian business **unequivocally** dictated the liquidation of Ukrainian commerce. The problem was to **divert** Ukrainian commerce to new and unknown paths [7].

Questions:

1. What were the advantages of the Ukrainian economy?
2. How did Russia topple down the Ukrainian economy?

Russian goods in the Ukrainian market

In this connection M. Slabchenko wrote: "Russian merchants were particularly interested in Ukrainian markets, because there they not only got raw material, but also **disposed of** goods of **inferior** quality... goods delivered from Russia were of much lower quality than those distributed in Russia itself, and prices **obtained** in Ukraine were 15 % to 20 % higher. The tariff of 1822 secured particular privileges to Moscow merchants, and in this connection a lot of so-called "fancy goods" (textiles) were pushed into Ukraine. The Kreshchensky and Illinsky **fairs** alone handled almost 22 million rubles worth of Russian manufactures, which was about one-third of the total production. Russian textile goods crowded out the Ukrainian altogether" [7].

Question:

1. Why did the Russian merchants bring goods of bad quality into Ukraine?

The situation with the Ukrainian grain trade

The grain trade of Ukraine became the main problem to be solved before Russia could conquer the Ukrainian economy completely.

What made the situation even more complex was the fact that Ukraine, situated on the seaboard, was naturally **drifting** into participation in world ocean trade and was thus becoming an organic part of the European economy (...)

An important stage in the development of seagoing trade, subsequently playing an important part in its further growth, was the granting to Odessa, in 1817 of free customs zone privileges, finally **effectuated** in 1819. This made Odessa a **warehousing** point for foreign goods and guaranteed duty-free exchange of goods within the **prescribed** zone.

This situation created for the Russian industrialists and merchants a **dual** problem. First, they had to remove from the Ukrainian markets the foreign exporters dangerous to them and replace them with their own capital, and then they had to **impair** the significance of the Black Sea and turn Ukrainian grain northward to their ports on the Baltic. The Crimean War of 1854 to 1856 helped realize the first task, "removing the foreigner and putting

in his place the Russian exporter aided by tariffs". The war also helped in lessening the importance of the Black Sea not only by **halting** all traffic for the duration, but also by destroying the merchant fleet. The restoration of this fleet proceeded under the new form, completely in the hands of Russian capital of the "Russian Company for Steam Navigation and Commerce" [7].

Questions:

1. What were the methods used by Russia in conquering the Ukrainian grain market?

The Russian policy against the Ukrainian grain trade

The channelling of Ukrainian grain northward required more complicated steps. One of them was the price policy of grain. In Ukraine, local prices were kept at a much lower level than in regions which **gravitated** to Baltic ports. **Freight** rates and duties were much lower in the Baltic than in the Black Sea ports in spite of a greater distance of grain producing areas from the former...

This difference in freights and tariffs was felt even more **acutely** when Russia started building **railroads**, and halted them in Ukraine. In the correspondence of a Ukrainian landlord, Andry Storozhenko, with his son, we read: "But they did not hurry with Ukraine, although Ukrainian merchants and landowners were already **vociferous** about this matter (construction of railroads). Conversations started in connection with the fact that American grain began to take the place of Ukrainian on foreign markets. But both freight and **insurance** were higher in Ukraine (insurance from Odessa to London was 2.5 % and from New York to London 1.5 %. It took almost twice as long to ship grain from Ukraine as it did from America".

Ukrainian landowners were very busy in the matter of building railroads, but "the Government made such **severe** demands on corporations that they could not be complied with".

The results of this policy soon became **apparent**. "In the 1850's England was lost as a purchaser, now being able to buy the same Ukrainian grain in Baltic ports, the Scandinavian nations also, although the Black Sea still offered **stiff resistance** to **encroachments** of Baltic ports and Russian exporters, even during periods of lowest depression".

The Black Sea grain trade itself finally came under Russian control, being unable to avoid the general process of colonial exploitation [7].

Question:

1. What role did the first railways play in Ukraine? Explain in detail.

Theme 7. The Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary in the second half of the nineteenth century

The position of landlords in the Dnieper Ukraine

Even this excessively high price of land in Ukraine did not add to the landlords' desire to **transfer** larger areas of land to the peasants than was done in Russia. The natural and economic conditions in Ukraine at the time determined a capitalistic nature of large agricultural enterprises. This was the cause of the landowners' desire to hold on to as much land as possible, because land played the role of capital. (...)

A decrease in the amount of peasant holdings in Ukraine was also in the interests of the Imperial Government. In it was **perceived** the best **guarantee** against the danger of a lack of human labor on the large estates, in whose conservation it was interested, because they provided the main source of exports of goods, the profits of which, as we shall indicate later, benefited the Imperial Treasury. The nine-year obligation of former serfs to work on lands of their former masters authorized by the *Polozhenie* and the so-called "**obedience**" provided a **temporary** solution to the problem...

The results were these: the peasants of the centrally located and more industrialized regions of the Empire lost only 9.9 % of their **former** land uses, while in Ukraine, where the land was the **sole** source of **income** for the mass of the population, the area of land used by the peasants **decreased** by 30.8 %. The reform cost the peasants almost one-third of that land, off which they lived before 1861 [7].

Questions:

1. How and why did the Russian government and landlords collaborate?
2. How did peasants suffer from the government's policy?

The foreign capital and the Dnieper Ukraine

The statement that Russia herself was a semi-colony of the Western European capital, does not conform to reality. Ukraine, and Azerbaijan with its oil were almost exclusively the object of this kind of exploitation, with the possible exception of gold mining in Siberia. It is true that Russia proper

consumed a large slice of foreign capital in the form of state loans, but, as we shall see later, the payment of these loans fell in large measure upon Ukraine.

Taking all **corporations** in the Empire, foreign capital was invested in them, according to the various branches of industry, during the ten-year period of 1890 to 1900.

Domination of foreign capital (English, French, German, Belgian) applies then only to non-Russian territories and primarily to Ukraine. Out of the corporate capital, the property of foreign **investors** of 1,343.5 million rubles according to the status in 1913 was: 465.7 million investments in Ukrainian industry; 126.9 million in Polish industry; 45.4 million in Latvian industry; 5 million in Lithuanian industry and 2.5 million in Estonian industry. Hence the amount remaining for the rest of the Empire was 703 million [7].

Question:

1. What character did the foreign capital's activity have in the Russian Empire?

Poverty of peasants and agrarian overpopulation

At the turn of the century, Galicia remained an agricultural society with a very small industrial sector. Some 95 percent of Ukrainians were peasants, who, much like their brethren in the Russian Empire, suffered from rural overpopulation and a shortage of land.

Although the serfs were legally freed from **bondage** in 1848, in a sense they remained economic serfs. There were several reasons for this. The right of the peasants to use the gentry-owned woods and pastures (the traditional servitude) was **revoked** with the **emancipation**, and now the peasants had to pay for the privilege. Their only source of income was their plots of land, but these were too small to provide a sufficient income. The peasants were forced to borrow and before long experienced chronic **indebtedness**. This state of affairs was only made worse as landholdings were repeatedly subdivided among **offspring**.

One solution peculiar to Austria-Hungary was mass emigration overseas; between 1890 and 1914, 717,000 Ukrainians left for the United States, Canada, and Latin America. Another result of the agrarian crisis was a gradual radicalization of the peasantry, which led to a series of impressive rural strikes in the early years of the twentieth century [19].

Questions:

1. What was the main problem for peasants in Galicia? Explain the causes of the peasants' miserable life.
2. Assess the serf emancipation of 1848 in Galicia in the light of its economic effect.
3. How did peasants rescue themselves?

4. Social and national composition

Ethnic Ukrainians constituted less than a fifth of the provinces small working class, the majority of workers being Poles and Jews.

In the eastern part of Galicia, Ukrainians **constituted** less than a third of **urbanites** and in Lviv, about 20 percent. The Polish **upper classes** and Jewish merchants continued to outnumber them in cities and towns.

Although the absence of a native noble class and the near-absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie, a merchant class, and industrial workers allow **scholars** to speak of the Galician Ukrainians' "**incomplete**" **social structure**, by the late nineteenth century, they had developed a small secular intelligentsia that was dedicated to the national cause and comfortable with political participation [19].

Question:

1. Why do scholars call the Ukrainian society an "incomplete" one?

Content module 2. The socioeconomic development of the Ukrainian lands from the twentieth century to the early twenty-first century

Theme 8. Ukraine in the early twentieth century. The Ukrainian lands during the First World War

Syndicates

Syndicates were **tremendously** important in the process of gaining control of Ukrainian industry by Russo-European capital and in its subsequent exploitation. They were established in the beginning of the 20th century in metallurgy ("Prodamet") in coal mining ("Produgol"), in sugar refining and in rail road equipment ("Prodwagon"). The syndicates formed an organic unit

with the entire system of improving colonial exploitation. Within a short time, such syndicates as "Prodamet" and "Produgol" became real dictators not only in the area of marketing, but also in large degree in the area of production itself. Their dictatorship was not restricted to the sectors in which they were established, but extended to the entire industrial life, inasmuch as those two sectors of industry (metallurgy and coal) nourish many others...

Although neither syndicates, "Prodamet" nor "Produgol" confined itself to the borders of Ukraine in selection of membership ("Prodamet" included fourteen Ukrainian plants, nine Polish, three Baltic and one Central Russian), nevertheless most important were their Ukrainian plants which accounted for nearly three-fourths of the total production of the Empire...

"All those syndicates were established in the form of common trading corporations, under 'commission agreements' for the sale of the products of their members. In reality they were strictly monopolistic organizations which held in the hands of a small group of monopolists the entire industry and dictated all market conditions for the products of industry so important to the national economy".

Who constituted this "small group of monopolists"? They were completely concentrated in the hands of owners of plants who were members of the syndicate, and those owners... were Russian banks and European capital, acting through those banks. Therefore the manufacturing profits of Ukrainian industry, as well as commercial profits from the marketing of their production, were in the same hands: Russo-European finance capital [7].

Questions:

1. Summarize the text (work in small groups)
2. Why are the syndicates considered to be the colonial instruments in Ukraine?

The Stolypin reform

In an attempt to **ameliorate** the condition of the peasantry, a new era of reform was begun in the Russian Empire after the Revolution of 1905. The minister of the **interior** at the time, Petr A. Stolypin, felt that new reforms were needed to **avert** revolutionary **disturbances** in the countryside in the future. He was **convinced** that the **root** of Russia's economic backwardness lay in the communal system of land ownership. Accordingly, he instituted two laws, in 1906 and 1910, aimed at replacing the village commune system

with a stratum of **prosperous** peasants. In the Dnieper Ukraine, more than 226,000 peasants withdrew from the communes landholdings that amounted to 4.7 million acres (1.9 million hectares). Again, the percentages varied from region to region. In the Right Bank and Volhynia, 48 percent of the peasants left the communes; in the Steppe Ukraine, 42 percent; in the former Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine, only 16.5 percent. As a result, the landholdings in most of the Dnieper Ukraine on the eve of World War I were in the form of what was known as either the *khutir* or the *otrub*.

The *khutir* was like an individual North American farmstead surrounded by land received in an **allotment** from the commune as private property to farm, expand, or sell. Successful homesteaders who increased their holdings by purchasing other *khutory* eventually became known as *kulaks*. The *otrub* consisted of a household in the village and the strips of land (*otruby*) beyond the village center that were given to it. At least three-quarters of the land reorganized in all the Dnieper-Ukrainian provinces except Kyiv and Chernihiv was in the form of *otruby*; in Kyiv and Chernihiv, an average of 55 percent of the land had *khutory* [11].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Why did Stolypin want to ruin the communes?

The Ukrainians in World War I

The first total war requiring complete mobilization of economies and inflicting horrendous civilian casualties, World War I was the outcome of Great Power politics in Europe. Although not a major cause of the war, the Ukrainian issue had been a source of considerable **tension** between the empires of the Romanovs and the Habsburgs. Russia claimed a special interest in the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs. In regard to Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, tsarist statesmen secretly hoped to annex these "Russian" lands, eliminating in the process these hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalism that had been spilling over (or so they suspected) into the Dnipro Ukraine.

At the war's start in August 1914, the proverbial "Russian **steamroller**" at first seemed to confirm its reputation. A large Russian army moved westward, capturing by early September all of eastern Galicia and Bukovyna. Although the Russian army, which included conscripts from Ukraine, was soon rebuffed by the Germans, Lviv remained in Russian hands until the summer of 1915.

Ukrainian patriots in both empires welcomed the war. While eastern Ukrainians were probably playing it safe in the face of a popular patriotic mood in Russia, their western counterparts were hoping for the new political opportunities that Russia's collapse might bring. The leaders of the Ukrainian parties in Austria-Hungary immediately established the Supreme Ukrainian Council, headed by the prominent National Democrat Kost Levytsky; the council declared their people's loyalty to the crown and called for the formation of a Ukrainian military unit. Among the mass of volunteers, the army command eventually selected some 2,500 to serve in **the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen**. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were conscripted to regular Austrian army units, as were millions of their brethren conscripted in the Russian Empire...

The war brought terrible destruction, human loss, and dislocation to Galicia and Bukovyna, where much of the fighting on the Eastern Front took place. On a more general scale, the colossal war effort caused extensive administrative and economic failures in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. As the social and **ethnic** imperial order disintegrated, widespread resentment in both states grew against the central authority. With nationality emerging as the new focus of popular loyalties, the age of multinational dynastic empires was rapidly coming to a close [24].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Why did states fight for Ukraine?

Theme 9. The Ukrainian lands in the National Democratic Revolution in 1917 – 1921

Third Universal of the Central Rada (November 7, 1917)

"In the capitals to the north a bloody civil struggle is raging; the Central Government has collapsed, and **anarchy, lawlessness** and ruin are spreading throughout the state...

Henceforth, in the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the existing property rights to lands of the nobility and to agricultural lands of other non-toiling ownership, including deeded lands, [lands owned by] monasteries and ministries, and church lands, are abolished.

The labor of the workers in **the Ukrainian People's Republic** must be placed on an orderly basis immediately. Now, we proclaim: from this day forth, an eight-hour workday is instituted at all enterprises in the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The difficult and terrible time which all of Russia and, with her, our Ukraine is experiencing, demands a proper organization of production, steady distribution of consumer products and a better organization of labor. Therefore, we charge the General Secretariat for Labor, together with the representatives of the workers, with the immediate establishment of state control over production in the Ukraine, guarding the interests of both the Ukraine and all of Russia... In the territory of the Ukrainian Republic, **the death penalty** is abolished.

All prisoners, all those detained for political activity committed prior to this date, including those sentenced and those not yet sentenced or charged, are hereby granted full amnesty.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian People's Republic shall secure all freedoms won by the All-Russian revolution: freedom of speech, press, worship, assembly, association, strikes, inviolability of person and residence, and the right and opportunity to use the native language in dealings with all administrative agencies.

The Ukrainian people, who have fought long years for their national freedom and have won it today, shall firmly defend the free national development of all nationalities residing in the Ukraine; therefore, we proclaim: **the Great-Russian, Jewish**, Polish and other peoples in the Ukraine are granted national-personal autonomy to guarantee their own self-government in all matters of their national life" [21].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Explain the position of the Central Rada. Why did they make this policy? Why did they continue to support the idea of autonomy?

The Hetmanate (April – November 1918)

The new state rested on an unusual mixture of monarchical, republican, and, most notably, dictatorial features. Its citizens were guaranteed the usual civil rights, with strong emphasis being placed on the sanctity of private property.

While revoking such innovations of the Central Rada as the nationalization of large estates and personal-cultural autonomy, the Hetman introduced a distinct category of citizens – the Cossacks – who were actually well-to-do peasants. He hoped they would act as the main social **pillar of his regime**.

The Hetman was closely associated with the propertied classes, which sought to undo the changes brought about by the revolution. Thus, such extremely unpopular measures as the "punitive expeditions," organized by landlords with the support of German troops to punish peasants for confiscating their lands the previous year, were blamed on Skoropadsky...

Soon spontaneous, fierce peasant revolts spread through Ukraine. Led by a local, often anarchistically inclined leader called (in the Cossack tradition) an otaman or batko and armed with readily available weapons, **hordes of peasants** fought pitched battles with German troops. The scale of these conflicts was huge: for example, in the Zvenyhorod and Tarashchanka regions of Kiev province, peasant forces numbering 30,000 – 40,000 men, equipped with two **batteries of artillery** and 200 machine guns, inflicted 6 000 casualties on the Germans. However, not all the uprisings were effective. In early August, when the Bolsheviks of Ukraine tried to lead a general rebellion, it collapsed within two days because of the lack of popular support [19].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Explain the position of the Hetman.

The Anarchists

Two of the most powerful **partisan leaders** were based in the steppes of the south where the richest, most self-confident peasants lived. One was Matvii Hryhoriiv (Grigoriev), a **swashbuckling** former tsarist officer who led a force of about 12,000 in the region of Kherson and maintained close links with the radical Ukrainians left. The other was the legendary Nestor Makhno, a **Russified** Ukrainian peasant and an avowed **anarchist**. In mid 1919 his forces, based in Huliai Pole, numbered between 35,000 and 50,000 men, and they often held the balance in the struggle for southern Ukraine. Thus, as regular armies fought for control of cities and railroad lines and partisan forces dominated the countryside, the only regime that was recognized throughout Ukraine was the rule of the gun [19].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Explain the position of *otamans*.

Directory's Ukrainian People's Republic, or the UNR (December 1918 – February 1919)

On 26 December 1918 the Directory issued its Declaration or statement of goals, which indicated that an attempt would be made to strike a balance between revolution and order. A preference for the former was quite apparent, however. One of the main features of the Declaration was the promise to **expropriate** state, church, and large private landholdings for redistribution among the peasants. Another was the government's commitment to act as the representative of the workers, peasants, and "**toiling** intelligentsia" – and its intention to disenfranchise the landed and industrial **bourgeoisie**. To this end it called for a Congress of Workers that would function as the representative and legislative body of the state [19].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. How might the socioeconomic views of the Directory be characterized?
3. Assess the Directory's political agenda.

The West Ukrainian People's Republic (the ZUNR, October 19, 1918 – January 22, 1919)

The all-important land question was treated in straightforward fashion: all large private **land-holdings**, which were mostly held by Poles, were to be expropriated and the land distributed to peasants with little or no land. From the outset, it was understood that the ZUNR would unite with the East Ukrainian state. On 22 January 1919, the act of unification, which guaranteed the ZUNR complete **autonomy**, was proclaimed in Kiev.

Probably the most impressive organizational achievement of the West Ukrainian government was the Ukrainian Galician Army. In yet another contrast to the East Ukrainians, the **Galicians** quickly agreed on the need for a strong, effective **regular army** [19].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast the policy of the UNR and the ZUNR.
2. Explain the position of the UNR and the ZUNR.

The Whites

The Whites attacked two institutions which they regarded as the mainstays of the nationalists movement, the cooperatives and the schools. An Azbuka agent wrote from Kiev in September: "The cooperative movement is the citadel of separatism where business is carried out in Ukrainian and you cannot hear any Russian at all. The **cooperative** movement as a whole is in the hands of separatists and is hostile to the Volunteer Army and to the idea of a united Russia". The Volunteers disliked cooperatives everywhere, because they regarded them as socialist dominated, but in the Ukraine they tried to suppress them...

Disenchantment with the army began among the workers. The annulment of Soviet money was a great blow to them. Then they found that the Whites could not reconstruct economic life and the factories remained idle. Although food prices were lower than in Soviet Russia, the unemployed workers could hardly feed their families.

In August the agents complained about a general apathy. As one of them who reported from the province rather than from the city put it: "among the peasants a feeling of **uplift** is missing"...

Two months later, the agents reported not apathy, but active hostility on the part of the population. The peasants had come under the influence of the anarchists, and their bands threatened White rule in the entire region. The workers struck increasingly often [6].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points of the Whites' socioeconomic policy.
2. Explain the position of the Whites.

The War Communism (1919 – 1921/1922)

Faced with economic collapse in all territories under their control, the Bolsheviks adopted the policy of "War Communism" – an emergency program of industry nationalization, grain requisitioning, and universal labor conscription. Initially, the new masters of the country did not worry too much about the collapse of the "capitalist economy", for they saw it as an opportunity for an instant leap into Communism. To some Bolshevik dreamers, War Communism opened a door into an egalitarian society of the future, where there would be no private property or free market, and where products would be distributed according to need.

In reality, however, life on the other side of the door was gloomy. In the villages, **compulsory** grain deliveries amounted to virtual confiscation carried out by armed detachments. To manage the nationalized factories and distribute food rations, the authorities created a vast bureaucratic machine that was notoriously inefficient. The end of economic ruin was nowhere in sight. Ironically, as desperate city dwellers tried to exchange any goods they possessed for food, some Bolshevik theorists actually celebrated the skyrocketing inflation as a sign of the "withering away of money".

In Ukraine, the Civil War delayed the implementation of the Soviet economic policy. Most of the elements of War Communism were first introduced in the republic during the spring and summer of 1919 and then reestablished after the defeat of the Whites early in 1920. These economic policies immediately led to widespread peasant resistance, so in the spring of 1920, the Bolsheviks placated them with a large-scale land distribution program. At the same time, faced with the need to fulfill the requisitioning quotas, the authorities established the Committees of Poor Peasants (Russian: *kombedy*, Ukrainian: *komnezamy*), hoping for their assistance against the rich, who were thought to be **hoarding** grain. But a new wave of peasant rebellions soon **thwarted** the requisitioning efforts. In October 1920, Lenin complained, "We take bread from Siberia, take it from the Kuban, but we cannot get it from Ukraine, because war is in full swing there and the Red Army has to fight against the bandits **proliferating** there".

All in all, War Communism failed as an economic model. It could provide subsistence levels of production and distribution but was unable to stimulate economic recovery [24].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points of the text.
2. Explain the position of the Bolsheviks.
3. What was the instant leap to Communism in the eyes of the first Bolsheviks?

Theme 10. The Soviet Ukraine in the interwar period (1921 – 1939)

The reasons for the NEP and famine of 1921 – 1923

Early in 1921, peasant **resistance** to grain requisitioning became overwhelming, and workers in many Ukrainian cities went on strike, forcing

the authorities to use military force against workers in what was officially a "workers' state". As the Bolshevik leadership was discussing the possibility of undoing War Communism in March 1921, an anti-Bolshevik mutiny broke out on the Baltic naval base of Kronstadt-famous for its role in the October Revolution-stressing the urgency of reform. (Incidentally, the mutiny began shortly after a large contingent of disaffected peasant recruits from Ukraine arrived at Kronstadt.) At the same time as **the Red Army** was suppressing the Kronstadt **rebellion**, Lenin announced at the **Tenth Party Congress** (March 1921) a temporary return to market economy, in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Overcoming objections from less pragmatic Bolshevik firebrands, Lenin persuaded the congress that a tactical retreat toward capitalism was necessary to prepare a later strategic advance toward socialism. The Soviet leader variously estimated the length of this retreat at either ten or twenty years...

Under the NEP, instead of arbitrarily confiscating all uncovered food "surpluses; the state required peasants to pay **a fixed tax in produce** and, later, **in cash**. The products remaining after payment of the tax could be sold on the open market. However, in Ukraine the introduction of the NEP came too late to prevent the unfolding famine. In addition to the general disorganization of agricultural production and the harsh requisitioning quotas of 1920 and 1921, a drought struck in Ukraine and the (Russian) Volga region in 1921, resulting in mass famine. The contemporary official estimate of deaths in the republic was 235,000, but present-day Ukrainian historians believe that the total number of the dead and their (estimated number of) unborn children might have been more than a million. In the summer of 1921, the Soviet government appealed to the West for help, opening the door to a massive American relief effort [24].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Why did the Bolsheviks start the NEP?
3. What might be added to the section about the Famine?

The NEP course

In the long run, the return to market relations in agriculture produced encouraging results, especially after 1923, when a tax in cash replaced the one in produce, and industrial goods became available for peasants to purchase.

The "tactical retreat" also worked for the economy in general. Later in 1921, the government began **denationalizing small industries**; private enterprises developed, particularly in consumer industries and service. In a short period of time, Ukrainian authorities **leased** to private owners as many as 5,200 enterprises – roughly half of the republic's total number of enterprises. In 1923, the state **earned** an impressive 850 million gold rubles in lease payments in Ukraine. Although large industries remained state-owned, the centralized allocation of resources was partially replaced by contracts between firms. Slowly, the revival of big industries began. But the NEP went furthest in the **revival** of private shops and the service industry, with the number of private trade establishments in the republic ballooning to 106,824 in 1926. Owing especially to the growth of **privatized agriculture, trade, and consumer industries**, by 1927 Soviet Ukraine's GNP attained pre-World War I levels [24].

Questions:

1. Why did the NEP reach success?
2. What were the main factors which contributed to the socio-economic life?

The Bolsheviks' reasons to dislike the NEP

For all the successes of the NEP, the Bolsheviks remained uneasy about this policy. Indeed, although agriculture recovered rapidly, the decision about how much grain to sell resided with "**petit bourgeois**" peasant owners rather than state planning organs. The peasants tended to sell less than before the revolution, for the simple reason that not enough reasonably priced, good-quality consumer goods were available for them to buy. In 1927 and 1928, the government initiated a fierce ideological campaign against the main producer of grain, the well-to-do farmer. The press presented the latter as a **kulak** (or **kurkul** in Ukrainian), a monstrous exploiter of poor peasants and someone who refused out of "class hatred" to sell grain to the Soviet state. At about the same time, the authorities began cracking down on private traders and entrepreneurs.

These developments were taking place against the backdrop of a theoretical debate in the Kremlin about how to industrialize the country. Led since 1925 by Stalin's men, the Ukrainian leadership unreservedly sided with their patron, who first defeated Trotsky with the help of the moderates and then adopted Trotsky's radical idea of rapid state-sponsored industrialization at the expense of the peasantry. The days of the NEP were numbered [24].

Questions:

1. Summarize the main points.
2. Why did Bolsheviks dislike the NEP?
3. Why did wealthy peasants suffer?

The Stalinist industrialization

...By his fiftieth birthday, which was celebrated with great fanfare in 1929, Stalin emerged as the unchallenged leader of the USSR. Prompted by a series of real and perceived crises – **the imaginary threat** of foreign invasion, the slackening of industrial growth because of the lack of large investments, and difficulties with the collection of grain launched a program of radical social transformation that the Soviets called the "great breakthrough" and later scholars dubbed "Stalin's revolution from above".

Measured in 1928 rubles, total state investments in Ukrainian industry grew from 438 million in 1929 to 1,229 million in 1932. Of some 1,500 new Soviet industrial plants constructed during the first five-year plan, 400 were begun in the Ukrainian SSR. Built between 1927 and 1932, the mammoth Dniprohes hydroelectric darn on the Dnipro – Europe's largest – became the poster image for Soviet industrialization. The press devoted an equal amount of attention to celebrating the new smokestack industry in Ukraine, in particular the giant Kharkiv tractor factory and Zaporizhzhia steel mill. Costing 933 million rubles, the latter was the most expensive construction project in **interwar** Ukraine. There was little industrial construction on the Right Bank, which the authorities viewed as a potential theater of war in the event of a conflict with Poland or Germany...

Apparently, the central **planners** envisioned Ukraine as the Soviet hub of coal extraction and ferrous metallurgy. In 1932, Ukraine supplied about 70 percent of the USSR's coal, iron ore, and pig iron – but only 23 percent of the country's finished metal products. There was even less local production of consumer goods. In general, Stalinist centralization soon led to the Ukrainian economy's direct subordination to Moscow. In 1927, the republic controlled 81 percent of the industry in Ukraine, but by 1932, this figure dropped to 38 percent [24].

Questions:

1. What are the main points of the text?
2. Think how the vast industrialization reflected in the life of different social groups in Ukraine.

Repressions against the "old" specialists

The breakneck tempo of industrialization, combined with the suspension of market mechanisms and fixation on gross output figures, led to inefficiency and poor quality. The press blamed **chronic faulty construction, breakage, and bottlenecks** on **resistance** from "old specialists" educated under the tsarist regime. Beginning with the 1928 show trial of fifty-three engineers accused of "wrecking" (sabotage) in the mining town of Shakhty in the Donbas (on the Russian side of the Ukrainian-Russian border), the authorities **silenced** engineers and planners who were arguing for a more reasonable rate of industrial development. When in early 1933 Stalin announced that the first five-year plan had been fulfilled at the end of 1932, no one dared to dispute his figures [24].

Questions:

1. What are the main points of the text?
2. Think how the vast industrialization reflected in the life of different social groups in Ukraine.

Kulaks' fate

In the language typical of the time, the Stalinists presented the campaign for the all-out socialization of the countryside as a class war, a crusade against the rich peasants or kulaks. Because the term "**kulak**" (**kurkul** in Ukrainian) had never been clearly defined, anyone resisting collectivization could be branded one. The press proclaimed that kulaks were wealthy peasants who exploited hired labor, but in reality, many of those who were hiring help were disabled war veterans, widows, and families with a number of small children. A peasant whom Soviet **statisticians** classified as "wealthy" had an income less than half of an average worker's salary. But the authorities needed to punish one group of "enemies" to subdue the rest of the peasant mass. In 1929, an official survey using economic criteria classified only 73,000 peasant households in the republic as kulak, but the state ended up confiscating property from more than twice this number. In 1934, the Ukrainian authorities announced the "dekulakization" of 200,000 **households**, roughly a million peasants. The government divided kulaks into three categories: anti-Soviet activists, who were to be shot, imprisoned, or exiled; rich exploiters, who were to lose all their property and be exiled; and politically harmless **kulaks**, who as politically unreliable were forbidden to join collective farms

and had to accept inferior land in the vicinity. Those who were subject to deportation were rounded up and jammed into railroad cars heading for Siberia, Central Asia, and the Soviet Pacific region. The mortality rate was staggering, especially among peasants who were dumped in frozen Siberia and the Soviet Arctic and abandoned to fend for themselves. Present-day scholars estimate that in 1930 the Soviet authorities deported some 75,000 "kulak" families from Ukraine. The available number for the first half of 1931 stands at 23,500 families [24].

Questions:

1. Why did authority crack kulaks down?
2. In what ways were kulaks repressed?

The causes of the 1932 – 1933 famine in Ukraine

Stalin must surely have realized that the defeat of a political opponent would be only a **temporary** victory, and he may well have decided to seek something much deeper, the destruction of the social basis of Ukrainian self-assertion. The Ukrainians had traditionally been a nation of peasants, and Stalin himself saw the nationality question as at bottom a question of the **peasantry**. As early as 1930 one finds statements in the Soviet Ukrainian press that in Ukraine the **collectivization** of agriculture had a particular task, the **elimination** of the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism, which was perceived to consist in individual peasant agriculture. The famine of 1933 seems to have been above all an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a social organism and political factor within the Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1928 the villages of the Soviet Union had to go through **annual procurement campaigns**, during which the local activists were led by an outsider (in the Ukrainian case, usually a non-Ukrainian worker from the industrial Donets Basin) who had been **issued a revolver** and told to achieve 100 per cent of the **quota** for the village he was assigned.

As economic depression worsened in the West, agricultural prices dropped steeply in relation to those of manufactured goods. The Soviet Union, whose entire plan of industrial development was based upon using the **profits** from the export of agricultural produce to pay for capital goods imported from the West, found that a given machine cost far more grain than had previously been the case. This provided an important economic motive for intensifying the exploitation of the peasantry, and the late Vsevolod Holubnychy **emphasized**

this as a cause of the famine. But it does not explain the geography of the famine and thus is far from constituting an adequate explanation of what took place [10].

Questions:

1. What were the reasons for the famine?
2. How was the famine organized?

Theme 11. The West Ukrainian lands in the interwar period (1921 – 1939)

Galicia under Poland

While Soviet Ukraine was undergoing rapid industrialization and urbanization, Ukrainian lands in Poland retained their traditional character as an agrarian **backwater**. The production of oil in Galicia declined, a result of the depletion of deposits, a lack of investment, and the high cost of extraction. The small Ukrainian **working class** in Galicia and its minuscule counterpart in Volhynia found employment primarily in forest industries and food processing. The situation became even worse during the Great Depression. With the collapse of agricultural prices and a lack of industry try to relieve **rural overpopulation**, villagers saw immigration as the only way to radically improve their lives. But during the interwar period, the United States and Canada restricted their admission of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, as well as Asia. Still, some 150,000 western Ukrainians managed to emigrate between the wars, mostly to Argentina, France, and Canada. Those remaining faced a daily struggle for survival on **tiny plots of land**.

More than half of all Galician peasants possessed landholdings of less than two **hectares** or five **acres**. Agrarian reform was slow to arrive, and when the Polish government finally began the voluntary partitioning of large estates, it awarded most of the land in Ukrainian territories to Polish colonists. The Ukrainian peasants' hunger for land remained unsatisfied, and during the 1930s, nationalists used rural discontent to strengthen their support in the countryside. This constituency was essential to their power base because a majority of urban residents were either Poles or Jews and upward of 90 percent of the region's Ukrainian population lived in the villages of eastern Galicia and western Volhynia [24].

Question:

1. What peculiarity did rural overpopulation have in Galicia?

The Cooperative movement

The only economic success story in the region was that of the rural Ukrainian cooperative movement, which, beginning in the late nineteenth century, grew rapidly as a counterweight to Polish-controlled state and economic agencies. By the late 1930s, eastern Galicia boasted some 4,000 Ukrainian cooperatives with a total membership of more than 700,000. The most important of them was Maslosoyuz (**Dairy Union**), which helped 200,000 farmers market their products in Poland and abroad. Large cooperative organizations stabilized prices and provided peasants with agricultural education. In addition, they supported Ukrainian cultural life and provided managerial or clerical jobs for the national intelligentsia...

Polish **discrimination** against organized Ukrainian life peaked in the fall of 1930. In response to nationalist-incited peasant attacks on Polish estates, government **troops** occupied the region, **dismantled** Ukrainian cultural institutions, **indiscriminately brutalized** the population, and made thousands of arrests. Having suppressed peasant discontent, the authorities tried 909 Ukrainian activists, including five deputies to the **Sejm** (House of Deputies). The "**Pacification**" of 1930 further alienated Ukrainians from the Polish state and caused an international outcry over Warsaw's treatment of its national minorities [24].

Question:

1. How did the Polish-Ukrainian antagonism display itself in Galicia during the interwar period?

The Bukovyna economy

One aspect of Bukovinian life that did not change much was the economic status of the Ukrainian population. As under Austrian rule, the vast majority continued to work as small-scale **subsistence farmers**, some of whom **supplemented** their income by raising livestock, in particular sheep. Like Poland and other countries in central Europe, Romania introduced a **land reform program** during the 1920s whose goal was to reduce the size of large landholdings. Although 186,000 acres (75,500 hectares) of land from

landed estates in northern Bukovyna were offered for sale, most did not go to the **indigenous** population, but rather to Romanian **in-migrants** from other parts of the country. Moreover, while the newcomers received 10 acres (4 hectares) of land and 2.5 acres (1 hectare) of pasture on average, individual Ukrainian farmers increased their holdings by only half a hectare on average.

Land was paramount, because Ukrainians in Romania had no economic alternatives. In both northern Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia industry remained underdeveloped. By 1930, for instance, northern Bukovina had only 15,000 factory workers. This meant that throughout the interwar years of Romanian rule the two regions remained economically backward, with their Ukrainian population engaged almost exclusively in small-scale **subsistence agriculture or livestock raising** [11].

Question:

1. Compare and contrast the Ukrainians' life in Bukovina and Galicia during the interwar period.

The Subcarpathian Rus

In its economic life, Subcarpathian Rus did not fare well. Agriculture remained the **mainstay** of the region's economy, and local industrial development was effectively stifled. This was because it proved economically more beneficial to export products from the highly industrialized western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia to Subcarpathian Rus than to build new factories there. As for products derived from the region's own natural resources, particularly **lumber** from the Carpathian forests, businesses in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia found it cheaper and easier to import forest products from neighboring Slovakia. The result was that the vast majority of the Rusyn/Ukrainian population – 82 percent in 1930 – was engaged in agricultural or **forest-related work**. Whatever trade or **small-scale industry** existed was in the hands of the local Magyar and Jewish inhabitants (who made up respectively 15.4 percent and 12.8 percent of the Subcarpathian population in 1930), or of Czechs, who began to arrive in steadily increasing numbers (by 1930 they comprised 2.9 percent of the area's population) [11].

Question:

1. Compare and contrast the Ukrainians' life in Bukovyna and the Subcarpathian Rus during the interwar period.

Theme 12. The Social and Economic changes in the Ukrainian lands in the Second World War

The Greek Catholic Church and Jews

The role of the Ukrainian Church and **Metropolitan** Andrii Sheptytsky constitutes a special chapter in the history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Sheptytsky's courageous stand against the **persecution** of Jews was probably **unequaled** in Europe...

The problem did not rest with the Germans alone. Some Ukrainians, particularly members of the indigenous police, also participated in the **persecution** and murder of Jewish people. It was basically to them that Sheptytsky addressed his November 1942 **pastoral letter**, entitled "Thou Shalt Not Kill" (*Ne ubyi*). Read in all churches instead of **the Sunday sermon**, the epistle threatened with divine punishment all individuals who "shed innocent blood and make of themselves **outcasts** of human society by disregarding the **sanctity** of man".

In his efforts to help Jews, Sheptytsky became directly involved in rescue operations. Using his high office and church organization, he enlisted some 550 monks and nuns in saving the lives of 150 – 200 Jewish children. The metropolitan's **immediate partners** in this undertaking were his brother Klymentii, who was the **archimandrite** of the Studite monasteries, and his sister Josepha, who was **mother superior** of the **nunneries** [5].

Questions:

1. What were the main methods of the Greek-Catholic Church in its saving-Jews campaign?
2. What role did Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytsky play in saving Jews?

The Nazi collective farms

Food from Ukraine was as important to the Nazi vision of an eastern empire as it was to Stalin's defense of the integrity of the Soviet Union. Stalin's Ukrainian "**fortress**" was Hitler's Ukrainian "**breadbasket**". The German army **general staff** concluded in an August 1940 study that Ukraine was "agriculturally and industrially the most valuable part of the Soviet Union". Herbert Backe, the responsible civilian planner, told Hitler in January 1941 that "the occupation of Ukraine would liberate us from every economic worry".

Hitler wanted Ukraine "so that no one is able to **starve** us again, like in the last war"...

In the long run, the Nazis' General plan Ost involved seizing **farmland**, destroying those who farmed it, and settling it with Germans. But in the meantime, during the war and immediately after its (**anticipated**) rapid conclusion, Hitler needed the locals to **harvest** food for German soldiers and civilians. In late 1940 and early 1941 German planners decided that victorious German forces in the conquered Soviet Union should use the tool that Stalin had invented for the control of food supply, **the collective farm**. Some German political planners wished to abolish the collective farm during the invasion, believing that this would win Germany the support of the Ukrainian population. Economic planners, however, believed that Germany had to maintain the collective farm in order to feed the army and German civilians. They won the argument. H. Backe, H. Göring's food expert in the **Four-Year-Plan** Authority, reputedly said that "the Germans would have had to introduce the collective farm if the Soviets had not already arranged it".

As German planners saw matters, the collective farm should be used again to starve millions of people: in fact, this time, the intention was to kill tens of millions... [17].

Questions:

1. How did the Nazi use the soviet collective farms?
2. Why were the collective farms considered by the Nazi as the best tool?

The Nazi Hunger Plan

This was **the Hunger Plan**, as formulated by 23 May 1941: during and after the war on the USSR, the Germans intended to feed German soldiers and German (and west European) civilians by starving the Soviet citizens they would conquer, especially those in the big cities...

The Wehrmacht was not implementing the original Hunger Plan but rather starving where it seemed useful to do so. The Wehrmacht never intended to starve the entire population of Kyiv, only to ensure that its own needs were met. Yet this was nevertheless a policy of indifference to human life as such, and it killed perhaps as many as fifty thousand people. As one Kyivan recorded in December 1941, the Germans were celebrating Christmas, but the locals "all move like shadows, there is total famine". In Kharkiv a similar policy killed perhaps twenty thousand people. Among them were 273

children in the city **orphanage** in 1942. It was near Kharkiv that starving peasant children in 1933 had eaten each other alive in a **makeshift orphanage**. Now city children, albeit in far smaller numbers, suffered the same kind of horrible death [17].

Questions:

1. Select the most important words in the text. Explain why they are important.
2. Why did Nazi starve the urban population?

The POW's (prisoner of war) fate

Never in modern **warfare** had so many **prisoners** been taken so quickly. In one engagement, the Wehrmacht's Army Group Center took 348,000 prisoners near Smolensk; in another, Army Group South took 665,000 near Kiev. In those two September victories alone, more than a million men (and some women) were taken prisoner. By the end of 1941, the Germans had taken about three million Soviet soldiers prisoner...

Hitler wished to reverse the traditional logic. By treating Soviet soldiers horribly, he wished to ensure that German soldiers would fear the same from the Soviets, and so fight desperately to prevent themselves from **falling into the hands** of the enemy. It seems that he could not bear the idea of soldiers of the master race surrendering to the subhumans of the Red Army. Stalin took much the same view: that Red Army soldiers should not allow themselves to be taken alive. He could not counsel the possibility that Soviet soldiers would **retreat** and surrender. They were supposed to advance and kill and die. Stalin announced in August 1941 that Soviet prisoners of war would be treated as **deserters**, and their families arrested. When Stalin's son was taken prisoner by the Germans, he had his own daughter-in-law arrested. This **tyranny** of the offensive in Soviet planning caused Soviet soldiers to be captured. Soviet **commanders** were fearful of ordering withdrawals, lest they be personally blamed (purged, and executed). Thus their soldiers held positions for too long, and were encircled and taken prisoner. The policies of Hitler and Stalin conspired to turn Soviet soldiers into prisoners of war and then prisoners of war into non-people.

Once they had surrendered, Soviet prisoners were shocked by the savagery of their German captors. Captured Red Army soldiers were marched in long columns, beaten horribly along the way, from the field of battle to the camps.

The soldiers captured at Kiev, for example, marched over four hundred kilometers in the open air... Prisoners who were wounded, sick, or tired were shot on the spot, their bodies left for Soviet citizens to find and clean and bury.

When the Wehrmacht transported Soviet prisoners by train, it used open **freight cars**, with no protection from the weather. When the trains reached their destinations, hundreds or sometimes even thousands of frozen corpses would tumble from the opened doors. Death rates during transport were as high as seventy percent. Perhaps two hundred thousand prisoners died in these death marches and these death transports. All of the prisoners who arrived in the eighty or so prisoner-of-war camps established in the occupied Soviet Union were tired and hungry, and many were wounded or ill...

German prisoner-of-war camps in the Soviet Union, however, were something far out of the ordinary. They were designed to end life [17].

Question:

1. Select the most important words in the text. Explain why they are important.

Theme 13. The Ukrainian SSR in 1945 – 1991

Stalinist economic policy after World War II

The fourth **Five-year plan** (1946 – 1950) proved a success because in a command economy, the government could concentrate investments and workers' labor on a single task, rebuilding heavy industry. By 1950, the republic's industrial output already exceeded the prewar levels... In the absence of foreign investments, the authorities achieved such a feat by demanding sacrifices from a population that was forced to underconsume. In contrast to industry, Ukrainian agriculture during the postwar decade did not benefit from heavy state investment. Khrushchev's bold projects aiming to consolidate collective farms into large "**agro-cities**" could not overcome wartime devastation and the lack of workers (especially men who had perished in the war). Although the authorities eventually abandoned their restructuring plans, the republic's grain harvests in 1950 and even in 1955 could not match the prewar levels. Combined with agriculture's other woes, the **drought** of

1946 led to a famine in the countryside. As in 1932 and 1933, ruthless grain collection policies and official denial of the problem cost the Ukrainian peasants dearly. The only official data showing the famine's scale are the number of people diagnosed in 1947 with dystrophy (serious weight loss and weakness associated with impaired nourishment): 1,154,198. Present-day day scholars estimate the number of starvation-related deaths at anywhere from 100,000 to a million.

Stalinists in western Ukraine

The Soviet plan to absorb western Ukraine included several population exchanges with Poland resulting in the departure of 810,415 Poles and the arrival of 482,880 Ukrainians. This spelled the end of the centuries-long Polish presence in Ukraine, as well as a closure to the bitter Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia... Between 1944 and 1950, they exiled to Siberia 203,662 western Ukrainians, mostly family members of nationalist guerrillas (...)

By 1948, the Soviet authorities felt secure enough to begin the forced collectivization of the region's agriculture, which was largely completed by 1951.

Because the official concept of socialist transformation also included **industrialization**, Moscow made a point of developing industry and **mineral extraction** in western Ukraine as well. During the first postwar decade, the region's industrial output increased fourfold, and Lviv-made buses and radios became a familiar sight throughout the Soviet Union [24].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast the situation in the western Ukraine and other Ukraine under the Soviet rule.
2. What were disadvantages of the Soviet approach to economy?

The OUN-UPA fighting and the Operation "Vistula" (Wisla)

According to new research, the United States and Britain began supporting the **Ukrainian insurgents** as early as 1946, and the Soviet discovery of this backing fueled the emerging Cold War". Meanwhile, the main forces of Ukrainian **partisans** withdrew to the forest area along the Polish-Ukrainian border, as well as to eastern Poland, to escape systematic security sweeps through the villages of eastern Galicia and Volhynia during 1945 and 1946.

After the partisans ambushed the Polish deputy minister of defense, General Karol Swierczewski, the Polish government organized **Operation Wisla**, a **punitive military action** against the UPA. During the spring and summer of 1947, Polish, Soviet, and Czechoslovak troops suppressed the **guerrilla** resistance in Poland's eastern regions and forcibly resettled some 150,000 of the remaining local Ukrainian population in the country's northwest [24].

Question:

1. What were the causes of the Operation "Wisla" and its results?

Stalinist antisemitism

Yet by the end of 1948 Stalin had decided that Jews were influencing the Soviet state more than the Soviets were influencing the Jewish state ...

In late 1948 and early 1949, public life in the Soviet Union veered toward **antisemitism**. The new line was set, indirectly but discernibly, by *Pravda* on January 28, 1949. An article on "unpatriotic theater critics", who were "bearers of **stateless cosmopolitanism**", began a campaign of denunciation of Jews in every sphere of professional life. *Pravda* purged itself of Jews in early March. Jewish officers were **cashiered** from the Red Army and Jewish activists removed from leadership positions in the communist party. A few dozen Jewish poets and novelists who used Russian literary **pseudonyms** found their real or prior names published in **parentheses**. Jewish writers who had taken an interest in Yiddish culture or in the German murder of Jews found themselves under arrest. As V. Grossman recalled, throughout the whole of the USSR it seemed that only Jews thieved and took bribes, only Jews were criminally indifferent towards the sufferings of the sick, and only Jews published vicious or badly written books.

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was formally dissolved in November 1948, and more than a hundred Jewish writers and activists were arrested. The writer Der Nister, for example, was arrested in 1949, and died in **police custody** the following year...

Soviet Jews now risked two **epithets**: that they were "Jewish nationalists" and "rootless cosmopolitans". Although these two charges might have seemed mutually contradictory, since a nationalist is someone who emphasizes his roots, within a Stalinist logic they could function together. Jews were "cosmopolitans" in that their attachment to Soviet culture and the Russian language was supposedly insincere. They could not be counted upon to defend the Soviet

Union or the Russian nation from penetration by various currents coming from the west. In this guise, the Jew was **inherently** attracted to the United States, where Jews (as Stalin believed Jews thought) could go and become rich [17].

Questions:

1. Why were the Jews persecuted?
2. In what way were Stalin and Hitler similar as to their policy towards the Jews?

Khrushchev's economic reforms

Heavy industry had to be rebuilt first, because state prestige and military might depended on it. In contrast, food shortages and the lack of consumer goods did not constitute a major concern. Soviet agriculture **stagnated** during Stalin's last years, as it received almost no investments during postwar reconstruction. Yet, Khrushchev saw the declared aim of the Soviet project, Communism, as a social order under which ordinary people would live better than under capitalism. His unrealistic call in 1957 to catch up with and overcome the United States in the production of meat, milk, and butter may sound naive today, but for **contemporaries** it was a refreshing change after decades of deprivation and famine.

As a major agricultural region, during the late 1950s, Ukraine benefited from impressive increases in state purchasing prices for grain (sevenfold), potatoes (eightfold), and cattle (fivefold). This, together with debt forgiveness, rejuvenated collective and state farms, which could now afford modest improvements. On one of his visits to Ukraine, Khrushchev decided to abolish the Machine and Tractor Stations, once established by Stalin as machinery depots and political **supervision centers** for nearby farms, and in 1958, the state sold the stations' equipment to the collective farms. During the late 1950s, agricultural production in Ukraine on average grew by 8 percent per year. Food supply to the cities and farmers' standard of life both began improving during this time. Thousands of Ukrainian agricultural specialists, however, left for Kazakhstan and eastern Siberia, where they were recruited to work on Khrushchev's "**virgin lands**" scheme to cultivate unused land there.

Although the general idea of these reforms was sound, specific agricultural experiments under Khrushchev could be as destructive as some of Stalin's measures. In 1955, the state decreased by half the allowable size of individual plots, the parcels of land near their houses that collective farmers were

permitted to keep. While ideologically suspect, these private plots contributed greatly to the economy. They not only fed peasant families but also allowed them to sell the surplus at city markets, thus alleviating food shortages there. The cut in their size, thus, hurt both peasants and urban consumers. Another damaging experiment was connected to Khrushchev's infamous infatuation with corn. During the late 1950s, the Soviet leader issued the directive to devote 20 percent of arable land in Ukraine to this crop, at the expense of the traditional wheat. By the decade's end, the growth in agricultural production had slowed down. Two years of bad harvests, 1960 and 1963, delivered the final blow to Khrushchev's dream of **heating** the United States in food production. For the first time in its history, in 1963 the Soviet Union was forced to purchase grain from abroad. In 1962, citizens' discontent over rising prices on food in state grocery shops and farmers' markets led to isolated clashes with police and vandalism of shops in Ukraine [24].

Questions:

1. Compare and contrast Stalinist and Khrushchev's socioeconomic policy.
2. Why did Khrushchev begin his "reforms"?

The Soviet living standards

Soviet living standards rose considerably during the post-Stalin era, especially between the late 1950s and early 1970s. Khrushchev was the first to seriously address the housing crisis with a massive residential construction program, even if at the cost of lowering standards; from 1956 to 1964, more apartments (measured in total square meters of new living space) were built in Ukraine than during the entire period from 1918 to 1955. His successors continued **residential construction**, albeit still at a rate that did not match demand. Most Soviet citizens, especially in the cities, were theoretically entitled to free accommodations from the state with only minimal **maintenance payments**. In 1974, 1.3 million families in Ukrainian cities were on the housing **wait-list**, and the average urban resident had just 12.6 square meters of living space. More and more families owned household appliances, but Soviet Ukraine lagged behind the West in terms of both their quality and quantity [24].

Questions:

1. What improvements were there in people's life?
2. Why were the improvements limited?

Theme 14. Ukraine in 1991 – 2010

The 1990s Ukrainian nation and the standard of life

The standard of life in Ukraine plummeted during the early 1990s. With their **savings** wiped out by hyperinflation, salaries not catching up with rising prices, and goods simply not being available for purchase, chase, much of the population retreated to a subsistence economy in which a primitive barter system of goods and services, as well as cultivation of small garden plots in the countryside, ensured survival. During the early to mid-1990s, an estimated three quarters of Ukrainians lived below the poverty level. With the decline of state welfare and health systems, the average life expectancy and birth rate both took a plunge, and the country's population declined rapidly from a high of 52 million in 1989, to 48.5 during the 2001 census. Another contributing factor was emigration, with Ukrainian Jews in particular leaving **en masse** for Israel, the United States, and Germany. Large numbers of ethnic Ukrainians were also immigrating to North America and western Europe in search of a better life.

The only social group that found the situation to their liking was the new rich: a mixture of high government officials moonlighting as **big-league traders** and private **businesspeople**, who were often former Soviet industrial managers, Komsomol functionaries, or black **marketeers**. With the government's connivance, the new elites amassed huge fortunes by **looting** state assets and reselling subsidized Russian oil and gas in Europe at world prices. The ugly face of Ukraine's early economic transformation reflected the lack of a strong democratic, reformist political force in the country [24].

Questions:

1. What were the main problems of the post-Soviet Ukraine?
2. How was the economic and social crises connected with the previous period?

Agriculture, small business and new capitalists

In agriculture, inefficient Soviet-period collective farms survived under the name of "**collective agricultural enterprises**" while the class of individual farmers remained small, if increasingly important, in the production of meat, dairy products, and fruit. This was due in part to the fact that farmers could only

rent their fields. Because the Communists and their allies were **categorically** opposed to the sale of land, in 2001 the Verkhovna Rada finally passed a land code making such transactions possible, but its implementation was postponed until 2007 or later.

Small businesses were suffocating under the burden of taxes, which sometimes reached 90 percent. Much economic activity therefore escaped into the "**shadow economy**", which operated underground. Even at registered enterprises, however, workers were often paid in cash to hide the business's real size and evade the employer's contribution to the state pension fund. Direct foreign investment remained so small as to be negligible. Large-scale privatization of industry began in earnest between 1996 and 1998, but the oligarchs and Red directors benefited most by buying major enterprises for next to nothing and with privatization certificates snatched for pennies from impoverished workers. Even after they became private owners, Ukraine's new capitalists had little incentive to improve productivity, because they were getting more from government subsidies and tax privileges [24].

Questions:

1. Why did the Ukrainian agriculture decline?
2. Identify the main socioeconomic problems and suggest your own solution to them.

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НАВЧАЛЬНЕ ВИДАННЯ

**Тексти і завдання
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ІСТОРІЯ УКРАЇНИ"**

**для студентів усіх напрямів підготовки
всіх форм навчання
(англ. мовою)**

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Укладач **Пастушенко Андрій Олександрович**

Відповідальний за видання *О. С. Черемська*

Редактор *З. В. Зобова*

Коректор *З. В. Зобова*

Подано ключові тексти з навчальної дисципліни згідно з модулями й темами робочої програми. Після кожного тексту запропоновано запитання з метою стимулювання аналітичної рефлексії студентів. Завданнями роботи є вдосконалення знань з програмних тем шляхом опрацювання допоміжної інформації з текстів, написаних або перекладених носіями англійської мови, стимулювання студентського аналітичного та критичного мислення та розвиток студентського автономного навчання.

Рекомендовано для студентів усіх напрямів підготовки всіх форм навчання.

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Видавець і виготовлювач – ХНЕУ ім. С. Кузнеця, 61166, м. Харків, просп. Науки, 9-А

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